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Abstract
The current Afro-Chinese relations on development projects in Sub Saharan Africa
has come under a lot of scrutiny, with some experts in the South-to-South
relationship discourse claiming the above short-gun-marriage will hurt Africa in the
long run while other experts and African leaders believe it is the best strategy to
help Sub Saharan Africa develop economically and infrastructure wise.
This thesis examines the Bui hydroelectric dam project, which is currently under
construction in Ghana by Sino Hydro (Chinese Company), with financing coming
from the Chinese government through the Exim Bank of China. It compares how the
Akosombo that was financed by the World Bank in the 1960s handled the social and
physical ramifications caused by the project, and how Sino Hydro is approaching the
same issues that will be created by the Bui dam project.
It reveals that the government of Ghana and the Bui Power Authority were very
careful about the planning process they adopted to ensure that displacement and
resettlement on the project site was handled professionally by Sino Hydro to ensure
the smooth running of the project. They applied International Financial
Corporation's (IFC-P7) standard on large development projects, even though the Bui
dam was being constructed and financed by China. Supporting the fact in order for
Africans to benefit from the Afro-Chinese relations, they have to ensure that the
proper structures are in place before negotiating contracts that will result in a win-
win outcome with the Chinese, and how these structures are still heavily influenced
by the Northern standards.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal
Title: Associate Professor of Law and Development
Director, MIT Program on Human Rights and Justice
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Chapter One
Introduction
South-South Relations
"Fifty years after China established its first diplomatic ties with an African country,
the third summit of the forum on China - Africa Cooperation was held in Beijing
from 3 - 5 November 2006. This was the biggest-ever gathering between Chinese
and African leaders. Significantly, all the 48 African countries that currently have
diplomatic relations with China took part in this meeting, and their heads of state
led most of the delegation" (Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Sept 2007).
The South-South relations are forms of interactions between actors representing
economically weak and relatively powerless countries.1 The majority of the South-
South relations have been designed to promote and empower less developed
countries (LDCs) 2 both economically and militarily, through the promotion of trade
and culture, military assistance, transfer of technology, investment and
development between the LDCs. The South-South relation's strategy is expected to
build the economies of the LDCs in a more effective way than the North-South
relations that has been in existence prior to independence and post independence of
most LDCs, especially in Sub Saharan Africa. The homogenous history that most of
the LDCs share in areas such as relative political instability, military rule,
1 See H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (1975) South-South Relations: The Economic and
Political Content of Interaction among Developing Countries.
2 Less Developed Countries.
colonization, human rights issues, struggle for independence, "natural resources
curse", poverty and exploitation set the stage for building a strong relationship to
develop themselves with minimum influence from the North.
However, can the South-South discourse economically empower LDCs without any
form of assistance from the North? Does the North have a role to play in the
development of the South-South relationship? Is it best to keep the North-South
relations alive, while promoting separate and distinct South-South relations? How
much influence does powerful Southern nations like China and Brazil have over the
less powerful Southern countries when playing the South-South game? Which areas
should the South-South relationship focus on more, in terms of development? What
is the role of international organizations in the South-South relationship? How do
these organizations play their role? How much influence do these organizations
have on the LDCs as compared to Northern nations' influence? How realistic is the
South-South paradigm in achieving economic independence for its members? How
sustainable is the South-South relationship? Which countries benefit most from the
South-South relations?
My thesis topic titled "The Bui Dam Impact on Ghana-China Relations:
Transparency, Accountability and Development outcomes from China's Sino Hydro
Dam Project in Ghana" will be used to answer the above questions by delving into
the current relationship between China and Africa (Sino Africa) on the development
front, using the current construction of the Bui Dam in Ghana by China (Sino Hydro)
as a case study, to understand the socio-political impact of the South-South relations
discourse. Prah (2007), argues that by and large, China's approaches to African
countries are currently making a positive difference to the African economies,3
while Rosenbaum and Tyler argue that even though the interaction among less
developed countries (LDCs) are increasing steadily, they are still far less influential
than the North-South relations, yet the North cannot be viewed as a monolith in its
relations with the South.4
According to Rosenbaum and Tyler, the oil crisis in the 1970s caused LCDs to be
more concerned about the security of nonmilitary supplies. Similar apprehension
was provoked by the difficulty in obtaining supplies during both world wars. The
above hostilities forced LDCs to fend for themselves and develop local resources.5 It
is fear of the above examples that have contributed to the development of the South-
South relations, in order to enable LDCs to achieve economic independence without
having to rely solely on the North for the supply of strategic commodities in times of
dire need. However, the fear of the most powerful LDCs dominating the less
powerful LDCs both economically and politically has resulted in the development of
a rather strong North-South relations and LDCs interaction with international
organizations has also strengthened. As an example, Argentines, which has
3 See Kwesi Kwaa Prah (September 2007) China and Africa: Defining a relationship.
4 See H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (1975) South-South Relations: The Economic and
Political Content of Interaction among Developing Countries.
5 See H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (1975) South-South Relations: The Economic and
Political Content of Interaction among Developing Countries.
experienced years of economic stagnation, fear that Brazil's new prosperity will
permit it to dominate Latin America economically and Politically.6
The above assertion clearly shows how the South-South relations among LDCs are
surrounded by doubts and uncertainties, prompting Rosenbaum and Tyler to argue
that the interstate politics among developing countries are weak relative to those on
the North-South or North-North planes. They argued that developing country
interactions with international organizations, depending of course on the institution
in question, are some ways similar in terms of intensity to North-South relations;
they are more intense than bilateral interactions between individual LDCs. They
believe there exists a relative weakness in bilateral South-South interactions and a
relative strength in LDCs interactions with international organizations, hence
international organizations seem to represent a workable mode for intensifying
South-South relations for the achievement of common ends. The above assertion is
demonstrated in Figure 1 below with a diagram showing a simplified paradigm of
North-South-South interstate politics and transnational interaction. It depicts how
LDCs and international organizations are more strongly tied to the waist
relationship-wise than among LDCs themselves.
6 See H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (1975) South-South Relations: The Economic and
Political Content of Interaction among Developing Countries.
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Figure 1. The effects of interstate politics and transnational interac-
tions on the impact of the North on South-South relations
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Kwesi Kwaa Prah on the other hand, argued that trade between China and Africa
jumped 39 percent to $32.17 billion in the first ten months of 2005, fueled by
increase oil imports and export of Chinese goods, largely textiles. The Sino-African
trade could see China outstripping the United States' preeminent position in the
next few years, with US-Africa trade estimated at $44.5 billion in 2004.7 South-South
trade between Sub Saharan Africa and China has steadily increased over the years,
despite the relatively low South-South relationship between poor and less powerful
LDCs. The trend in the South-South relationship that is more prominent these days
is eminent between the more powerful Southern countries and the less powerful
Southern nations, with the less powerful LDCs depending more on the powerful
LDCs to embark on development projects. The assertion above counters Rosenbaum
and Tyler argument regarding Argentina's concern about Brazil's possible
domination of the economic and political environment of South America.
However, the fear of political and economic dominance by a powerful nation like
China among less powerful LDCs cannot be underestimated, given the complains
made by some countries in Sub Saharan Africa regarding China's involvement on the
African continent. China outpaced Japan in 2003 to become the world's second
largest consumer of oil after the US, with Chinese oil consumption growing by about
7.5 percent per year.8 According to Prah, China currently imports one-third of its oil
needs and it is projected that by 2025 China will import two-thirds of its oil needs.
7 See Kwesi Kwaa Prah (September 2007) China and Africa: Defining a relationship.
8 See Kwesi Kwaa Prah (September 2007) China and Africa: Defining a relationship.
With Africa holding 8 percent of the world's proven oil reserve, it is not surprising
that China has struck or expanded on existing oil arrangements with Angola, Algeria,
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan, 9 with half of Sudanese oil going
to China. Sudanese oil makes 7 percent of China's imported oil, and the Chinese
invested $8 billion in joint exploration contracts in Sudan in an attempt to ensure
constant supply oil. An estimated 10,000 Chinese people are working in Sudan.
On the other hand, increased Chinese investment in development projects in Sub
Saharan Africa can be viewed from two different sets of lenses. They have increased
investment in less profitable sectors, which have been neglected or abandoned
western interest, for example, Zambia's Chambezi copper mines and the supposedly
exhausted oil reserves of Gabon. 1o According to Prah, the Afro-Chinese relationship
has open doors for export of African commodities to the Chinese market, Burkina
Faso sells a third of its cotton to China. Safo also underscores the above assertion by
saying that "it is left with Africa to bargain properly, in fact protest against China's
unfair trade practices that are killing local industries. After the summit, both China
and Africa should be winners."'
Despite the low level of impact that the South-South relation is having on LDCs,
compared to either North-South or South-International Organizations as argued by
Rosenbaum and Tyler, there is a strong believe by some South-South experts like
9 See Kwesi Kwaa Prah (September 2007) China and Africa: Defining a relationship.
10 See Kwesi Kwaa Prah (September 2007) China and Africa: Defining a relationship.
11 See Amos Safo (2007) Ghana: Textiles Workers Slam Government.
Prah and other African leaders that the Afro-Chinese relationship will go a long way
to help the continent develop. Prah argues that in order to strengthen and better
understand each other "Afro-Chinese relations have got to reach more effectively
into the area of culture and 'people to people relations'. There are indications that
already Africans are joining the queue in endeavor needs to be greatly strengthened
by increasing possibilities for such studies and learning processes in both Africa and
China". Following the third Sino-African Summit, held in Beijing (November 2006),
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on his return commented enthusiastically
about the meeting and commented that more Ethiopian agricultural products would
be allowed into China duty-free. China had pledged some $500 million for various
development projects in Ethiopia. 'China is an inspiration for all of us', he added.
'What China shows to Africa is that it is indeed possible to turn the corner on the
economic development'. 12
The Sino-African Summit held in Beijing on November 2006 resulted in the
endorsement of a three-year action plan to drive a 'new type of strategic
partnership" that would focus on pragmatic cooperation, equality and mutual
benefit. China in terms of the plan undertook to:
* Double aid to Africa by 2009 (to about US $1 billion).
* Set up a US $5 billion China-Africa development fund to encourage Chinese
companies to invest in Africa.
12 See Kwesi Kwaa Prah (September 2007) China and Africa: Defining a relationship.
* Provide US $3 billion in preferential loans and US $2 billion in preferential
buyer's credits to African countries.
* Cancel all debt stemming from Chinese interest free government loans that
matured by the end of 2005, for the 31 highly indebted and least developed
countries (LDCs) in Africa that have relations with China (an amount
estimated at around US $1.4 billion).
* Further open China's market to exports from African LDCs by increasing
from 190 to 440, the number of products receiving zero-tariff treatment.
* Train 15,000 African professionals, double the number of Chinese
government scholarships given annually to Africans (to 4,000) and send 100
senior agricultural experts and 300 youth volunteers.
* Build 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centers and 100 rural schools.13
The commitments by China from the summit explains the reason why some South-
South experts and African leaders believe the Afro-Chinese development discourse
is a paradigm that will put Africa on its path to building a strong and sustainable
economy, without having to rely on the North. It is due to the above assertion that I
chose to study the Bui Hydroelectric dam under construction in Ghana by Sino
Hydro (a Chinese company), with full financing for the project coming from the
Export-Import Bank of China through the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The
purpose of my thesis is to understand into details, how and why the Chinese operate
in Sub Saharan Africa and the structures or mechanisms put in place by the various
13 See Ernest Harsch (2007) Big Leap in China-Africa Ties: Beijing offers continent more aid, trade
and business.
African governments to ensure positive outcomes for the current wave of Afro-
Chinese investments are beneficial to all parties. Also study, how the politics
involved in the Afro-Chinese relations gets complicated and what must be done by
the host nations to ensure that they are not being taken advantage of when
negotiating for development projects with China. Chinese developments and
investments in Sub Saharan Africa in the 21st century, ranging from the construction
of stadiums, airports, roads, and apartment buildings to that of dams, have raised a
lot of eyebrows in recent times.
It has become obvious that Kwame Nkrumah's dream of the Akosombo dam leading
Ghana into industrialization failed, given all the negative impact that the project has
had on peoples live to date. The government of Ghana was keen on embarking on
the Bui hydroelectric dam project, with the notion that it is the only way to drive the
nation out of poverty and make its dreams come true. I will also attempt to answer
the question; why did the government of Ghana decided to embark on the
construction of the Bui dam, given the lessons learned from the Akosombo project
four decades ago if any attempt was made to initiate a learning process?
The rest of my thesis will be structured as follows: The next two sections presents
the core research questions and methodology of this study, going on to address the
issues of our premise, about whether the best planning standards were applied to
address the social and environmental ramifications of the project, why and how the
Chinese choose to finance the project, who actually pushed for the project between
the Ghanaians and the Chinese and what are the payoffs to both parties, and finally,
why there is a need for this research to be conducted?
Chapter 2 will be comprised of a summary of the Akosombo dam, which would be
used as a case study in my thesis to enable me compare the Akosombo and Bui dam
projects and how they were both handled regarding planning processes,
compensation and environmental impact studies, the social ramifications that
resulted due to the projects and what lessons were learnt by Ghana from the
Akosombo dam and how those lessons, if any at all, would impact the Bui dam
project. Chapter 3 will lay down into details the background of the Bui project and
the history of the indigenous people living in the Bui area and along the Black Volta
River where the dam construction is currently underway. This chapter will also
break down the land use and ownership policy being practiced in Ghana and how it
affects the indigenous people, and the politics of the government in acquiring the
lands for the project.
In chapter 4, an overview of the Bui dam project focusing specifically on the
contract, the planning process; feasibility studies and social survey conducted prior
to the sod cutting and post sod cutting. Chapter 5 will focus on analyzing the overall
project, to determine its impact on the environment, its social impact, economic
impact, and cost and benefits to both Ghana and China (Sino Hydro). Chapter 6 will
consist of conclusion, including policy implications and recommendations based on
the findings and further areas of research.
1.1 Core Research Questions
This thesis will attempt to the answer the 4 main research questions below:
* What planning standards are being used for the Bui dam construction and
why?
* Why is China playing a major role in the project, from financing to design to
construction?
* What do the Chinese get from the construction of the dam, besides the
financial payment for the loans granted and construction? How also then
does the Chinese government benefit?
* Why did the Ghanaian government decide to embark on the construction of
the Bui dam, given the lessons learned from the failure of the Akosombo dam
project?
1.2 Methodology
In order to answer the question of why the recent "South to South" relationship
between China and most Sub Saharan African countries has begun, and its impact on
development in the region given the trade-offs between the governments, I
employed several research instruments to examine the Bui dam project ongoing in
Ghana. The Bui dam serves as a good case study to research and analyze for a
number of reasons. First, the Bui dam represents one of the many development
projects being undertaken by the Chinese in Sub Saharan Africa, and it is being fully
financed by the Export Import Bank of China, which makes it significant and unique
among these projects, because of the implications to the Chinese government, not
only corporate involvement. Dam projects have caused a lot of disaster in the world,
but the Three Gorges dam in China, is perceived to be a relative success given how
the Chinese handled the environmental and resettlement problems that resulted
from the project. Finally, most of the Chinese-involved development investments in
Sub Saharan Africa are big projects that generally have negative consequences on
indigenous or marginalized low-income populations, like the residents of Bui. It is
thus prudent to investigate how the Bui dam project relates to all the above-raised
issues. The Bui dam project is now in progress, with phase one scheduled for
completion in 2012.
The research was limited to Ghana and the Bui dam, due to limitations such as time
and money. Thus the study of the Bui dam may not be enough to draw an overall
conclusion for what is going on regarding the Chinese involvement in development
in Africa in the 21st century, but it will help in better understand the shot-gun
marriage between China and Africa and how risky developments projects in Sub
Saharan Africa are being tackled by the Chinese.
My research employed the use of quantitative and qualitative data analysis. I
conducted interviews with the engineers both on site at Bui and in the capital of
Ghana-Accra, where the headquarters of Bui Power Authority (BPA) is located.
While on site I had the opportunity to visit some of the relocated settlements and
interviewed the residents. And because the projects is still ongoing, with the rock
blasting and river diversion underway before I left the site for the United States,
secondary data such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Surveys,
Feasibility Study, News paper reports and Engineering drawings were used in most
of the analysis. The refusal of some high-ranking stakeholders to directly participate
in interviews and to release project documents such as turnkey contracts between
China and Ghana (largely due to lack of information sharing by the two countries
with its ordinary citizens), it was impossible to properly review certain financial and
technical aspects of the project.
Chapter Two
The Akosombo Dam
The history of dams and their correlation to the destruction of lives and properties
has been well documented from the Narmada dam project in India to the Three
Gorges dam in China. The Akosombo dam is no exception of the above assertion. The
construction of the Akosombo dam in the 1960s on the Volta River resulted in the
creation of the world's largest man-made lake.14 Dams do not only dislocate homes
and livelihood of mainly rural and tribal people, they also devastate the
environment, submerge forest with their fauna and flora; give rise to other
ecological and health consequences. s5 The continuous criticism of the benefits and
cost of dams in both the short and long run in terms of silting that reduces the
lifespan of dams and their negative environmental impacts, forced the Thai
government to stop plans in to construct the Nam Choan Dam.16 Unfortunately
Ghana's learnt lesson from the negative impact of the Construction of the Akosombo
hydroelectric dam in 1965 did not stop the government to embark on the
construction of another mega hydroelectric dam in Bui on the Black Volta in 2008.
Ghana's River Volta waters spring from no less than 6 West African countries, and
almost two thirds of its 150,000 square mile basin is outside of Ghana - in Upper
Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Mali.17 But its 61,000 square miles lying
14 See James Moxon (1969) Volta: Man's Greatest Lake.
15 See Claude Alvares and Ramesh Billorey (1998) Damming the Narmada: India's Greatest
Environmental Disaster. The World Network.
16 See Claude Alvares and Ramesh Billorey (1998) Damming the Narmada: India's Greatest
Environmental Disaster. The World Network.
17 See James Moxon (1969) Volta: Man's Greatest Lake.
within Ghana is formed by water flowing from tributaries of the White, Red and
Black Volta.18 The unique nature of the Volta River, with it 2 gorges located in
Akosombo on the Volta River and Bui on the Black Volta, made it possible for the
construction of dams at these two separate gorges.
During the colonial days, Sir Albert Kitson a geologist who first discovered bauxite
in Ghana - in an effort to generate power to supply aluminum melting companies
noted the future of the Akosombo dam. The Indian born and Australian educated
Geologist known as Kiston did not only discover the possibility of building a dam at
Akosombo on April 24, 1915, whilst on a canoe voyage down the Volta river he also
pointed out the suitability of constructing another dam on the Black Volta. The
above discovery of Sir Kinston and the establishment of the British Kaiser
Aluminum Companies was the beginning of the Akosombo dam construction in
Ghana.
The major players in the planning and implementation of the Volta River Project
(VRP) were President Kwame Nkrumah, President John Kennedy, Edgar F. Kaiser,
the World Bank and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of Britain.19 The British
government's main reason for playing a marginal role in the Volta River Project was
18 See James Moxon (1969) Volta: Man's Greatest Lake.
19 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
due to economical gains that would benefit the Commonwealth of Britain. 20 The
British were interested in securing cheap aluminum prices to be produced in Ghana
by the electricity generated from the Akosombo hydroelectric dam, since at that
time 4/5 of United Kingdom's aluminum came from dollar sources and thus a shift
to colonial or "soft currency" sources would be beneficial to the UK.21 But by the
time the Volta River Project (VRP) report was completed and published in 1956; the
British government and its aluminum companies had lost interest in the project due
to the increased supply in world aluminum, which matched demand.22
The UK government's lost of interest grounded the project until the US government
and businesses resurrected it, but the UK continued to be a player even though it
had officially withdrawn. 23 The UK government's role was to advice the US
government when it had concerns about Kwame Nkrumah's anti-American stance
and had to decide whether to support the project.24 It has been argued by Hart that,
the US government's involvement in the Volta River Project was both political and
economical, since the US was seeking to increase its influence in Africa as part of its
cold war consideration and also expand the market for its goods, services and
20 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
21 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
22 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
23 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
24 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
companies. 25 The United States almost pulled out of the project due to Nkrumah's
unreliability as an American ally, but Kaiser's strong interest resulted in US
continuation of the project.26
In 1960 the Ghanaian government requested the World Bank to appraise the
project, as a process of finding additional financial support for the project.27 As a
result, the World Bank was prepared to make the first largest loan in the history of
Africa to a single project. The Bank started acting as the major negotiator between
the Aluminum companies and Ghanaian government through the process.
"New nations, such as ours, which are determined by every possible means to catch
up in industrial strength, must have electricity in abundance before they can expect
any large-scale industrial advance. Electricity is the basis for industrialization. That,
basically, is the justification for the Volta river project (Nkrumah K: 1961)."
Industrialization fashion in the 1960s was regarded as the cornerstone to economic
development in many postcolonial agricultural regimes of Africa. Kwame Nkrumah's
post independence agenda hence, was to modernize every sector of the economy
through structural transformation by state-led import substitution industries,
25 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
26 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
27 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
mechanized agriculture and expansion of formal education to supply skilled labor.28
With the identification of hydroelectric power as a key to industrialization, the
Nkrumah government sought for funds to build the Akosombo dam on the Volta
River, even though the proposal for the dam was inherited from the colonial
period.29 Kwame Nkrumah's goals of industrialization approached the development
of the dam with the assumption that all citizens of Ghana will benefit equally. The
above situation ignored the burgeoning class, rural-urban and the north-south
dichotomies in Ghanaian society and the situation that those who would benefit
from the VRP would not be the same as those who would be adversely affected. 30
In 1961, the government of Ghana passed the Volta River Development Act of 1961 -
Act 46 to establish the Volta River Authority (VRA) as the statutory corporation to
oversee the construction of the dam and generation of electricity. Since then the
VRA has overseen every dam construction project in the country including the
Kpong and Bui dam, which is currently under construction. In the same year an
Italian consortium called mpyregilo was awarded the contract to build the Akosombo
dam, the project started in 1961 and was completed in 1965 and commissioned in
1966.
28 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
29 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
30 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
The construction of the Akosombo dam resulted in the creation of the largest man
made lake-the Volta Lake. It inundated the villages, farmlands, sacred groves and
other religious grounds, burial sites and public institutions such as roads, health
centers, markets and schools of 80,000 people.31 The failure of the government to
establish a separate institution with the resources and mandate to address the
problems of dam affected communities left the VRA with this task, for which it was
ill equipped.32 Compensation was to be paid to two kinds of landowners; those
whose two million acres (80,000 hectares) of land were submerged, and those who
owned the 430,000 acres (172, 000 hectares) required for resettlement townships
and agriculture, but as at 2003 these compensation cases were still pending.33
The heavy impact of the Akosombo dam project on the surrounding communities
and the lack of human and technical capacity within VRA resulted in the
establishment of a Preparatory Commission tasked to prepare a report on
communities to be affected by the Akosombo dam and how the issue should be
approached. The commission recommended further study on a wide range of issues
including the dam's impact on affected communities, and the recommendation was
to be implemented by the Volta Basin Research Project (VBRP), which was
31 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
32 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
33 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
established in 1963.34 The VBRP struggled to catch up with the pace of the project
because of the time it was established; hence it could no implement the research
agenda set for it by the Preparatory Commission.
In spite of the challenges above, both the Preparatory Commission and the VBRP
had to make some predictions about the impacts of the Akosombo dam and the
Volta Lake on the local communities, their approach to the projects costs and
benefits, especially in relation to affected communities had a number
interconnected elements.35 These included:
* Caution in the calculation of loses through downplaying both the existing
value of the resources in question as well as the likely negative impacts on
the dam;
* Pointing out mitigating or beneficial effects and making recommendations to
realize and strengthen benefits, e.g. fish losses downstream being matched
against fish gains around the Lake, and measures proposed to realize fully
the fisheries potential of the Lake;
* Suggesting measures to repair or reduce any anticipated damage to
resources, e.g. dredging of creeks;
34 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
35 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
* And if all else failed, compensation. 36
The Preparatory Commission concluded that local effects of the dam and Lake could
be addressed satisfactorily, and identified the main effects of the dam as, 3,500 sq.
miles to be flooded, changes in pattern of the flow of the river from the dam to the
sea, problems of health and sanitation on the new Lake, the effects on agriculture,
forests and fisheries and the changed conditions of the Lower Volta.37 In addition,
the report made an explicit assumption that the government would set up
administrative machinery to address the above issues, just like how the Bui Power
Authority (BPA) was set up by the government to address any issues related to the
Bui dam. However, the above recommendations never materialized and VRA ended
up taking the task to run both the Akosombo dam construction and handle the
ramification issues caused by the dam as well, resulting in some residents not being
able to receive their compensation to date.
Given the above brief case study on the Akosombo dam, should one expect the
Ghanaian government to tackle the Bui dam project from more sustainable and
strategic angle? Did the Ghanaian government learn a lesson from the ramifications
caused by the Aksombo dam? If they did learn lessons, how are they using the
lessons learned to effectively engage in the construction of the Bui dam project? Did
the government of Ghana ever set up an Akosombo Review Committee after the
36 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
37 See Dodzi Tsikata (2006) Living in the Shadows of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
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construction, to evaluate the entire project and submit reports? If the government
did not set up any Review Committee, then how did it learn any lessons from the
Akosombo project? How far has Ghana as country come in terms of power
generation in 2008? How different will the Chinese approach construction of the Bui
dam, compared to how the World Bank, British and US approached the construction
of the Akosombo dam. In an attempt to answer the questions above, I will analyze
the Bui dam project, which is currently under construction in Ghana and other dam
projects in the world and try to find out how different or similar a Western or
Southern involvement in dam construction impacts the lives of poor and indigenous
people.
Chapter Three
Ghana- China Relations and the Bui Dam Project
The desperation of the African continent to develop has resulted in a lot of romantic
marriages between the African countries and its foreign counterparts over the
years. In recent times, the new development that is unfolding on the African
continent, is the relationship between individual African countries and their Asian
partner, the Chinese. "A growing country looking for markets andinfluence meets a
continent withy flenty of resources but few investors. 'ow that China has movedin,
though, its Africanpartners are beginning to resent their aggressive newpatron" (Serge
vichel Foreign 'Policy May/June 2008). In Brazzaville, everything new appears to
have come from China: the stadium, the airport, the televisions, the roads, the
apartment buildings, the fake Nikes, the telephones and even the aphrodisiacs
(Serge Michel, May/June 2008). Kids playing ball in the street of the Congolese
capital yell "ni hao ni hao" meaning hello in Chinese to every foreigner, as if all
foreigners are Chinese.
The Congolese minister for housing and construction, Claude Alphonse N'Silou
knows more about the Chinese reach in Congo than anybody (Serge Michel,
May/June 2008). In fact, he boasted in an interview with Serge Michel about how
the Chinese built the Alphonse Massamba Stadium, the foreign ministry, the
television company's headquarters and how they are now building a dam in
Imboulou and he claims it is a win-win situation for both sides and too bad for the
West. Between 2000-2007, trade between China and Africa has jumped from $10
billion to $70 billion, with China surpassing the UK and France to become the
continents 2nd trading partner after the US, and likely to overtake the US by 2010
(Serge Michel, May/June 2008).
The Chinese government's main source of foreign investment funds, the Export-
Import Bank of China is planning to spend $20 billion in Africa in the next 3 years-
roughly equal to the amount the entire World Bank expects to Spend in Africa the
same period (Serge Michel, 2008). This form of partnership results in a purely win-
loss situation for Africa, with the Chinese gaining access and control over oil, copper,
uranium, cocoa, cobalt and wood that will fuel its booming industrial revolution
back home, and Africa sees the completion of schools, roads and other key
development it desperately needs (Serge Michel, 2008), without thinking about the
long-term consequences. The above situation is only the beginning of another
paradigm of the colonization discourse. The Chinese are investing in the
construction of the Bui dam in Ghana, in exchange for Ghana's main cash crop
export known as the cocoa beans (Francis Kokutse, Allafrica.com December, 19
2007). Cocoa beans are used to make chocolate products, cookies, candy etc. Hence
its use as part payment for the Bui dam project would boost the production of
Chinese cocoa beans related products, since there will be no need for them to
compete for the cocoa beans on the world market at international prices.
China is beginning to run into same obstacles the West faced for years, and if China
is just another mortal investor, subject to the same problems, inefficiencies and
frustrations that every other global power has faced in Africa, it means the Chinese
miracle for Africa is nothing more than another lost opportunity (Serge Michel,
May/June 2008). According to Huang Zequan, vice chairman of the Chinese-African
Friendship Association, an estimated 550,000 Chinese nationals live in Africa,
compared to 70,000 Americans and 100,000 French citizens. Some were sent by
Beijing to build dams, roads and railroads, while others hope to get rich in some of
the poorest countries on the planet.
My thesis' main objective is to analyze the recent $1 billion contract signed between
the Government of Ghana and the Export Import Bank of China for Sino Hydro a
Chinese company to build the Bui Hydroelectric in Ghana from 2007 to 2012. The
entire Bui dam project is being designed, constructed and financed solely by the
Chinese without any other private international finance, hence the need to study
how the above relationship will impact Ghana's development agenda and the
Chinese motive behind this recent development relationship with Sub Saharan
Africa.
3.1 The Bui Dam Hydroelectric Project and the Black Volta
In 1961 during the construction of the controversial Akosombo hydroelectric dam,
resulted in the creation of the biggest manmade lake in the world. There were a lot
of sustainability issues surrounding the supposed Akosombo dam that was
supposed to help Ghana achieve its industrialization status. In 2006 the Volta River
Authority (VRA) and Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) between August 28, 2006
and 2008, was forced to introduce a National Load Management Program to ration
power in the entire country, due to inadequate energy production by the Akosombo
dam as result of the low water inflows into the Volta Lake and siltation.
In 2007, in an effort to permanently tackle the insufficient power problem in the
country, the government embarked on the construction of a new hydroelectric dam
project at Bui and the energy minister was quoted saying "I am overjoyedtoday, to
have this opportunity toparticipate in this mornings function; afunction that
symbolizes the beginning of the realization of a dream."38 The Bui hydroelectric dam
project is located on the Black Volta River at the Bui Gorge in northwestern Ghana,
as shown with an arrow marked with the words "project site" on the Ghana map in
figure 3.0 below. The project site is located on the Black Volta River at the Border of
Bole (Northern Region) and Wenchi (Brong-Ahafo Region) districts in northwestern
Ghana, approximately 150 kilometers (km) upstream of Lake Volta. Portions of the
project fall within Bui National Park and all components of the project lie entirely in
Ghana.3 9
38 Remarks by Hon. Joseph Kofi Adda, Ghana's minister of energy at the Bui dam sod cutting
ceremony on August 24, 2007.
39 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
Figure 3.0
36
11 -- - --
The Black Volta originates from Burkina Faso and flows approximately 1,350
kilometers south creating the western border of Ghana with both Burkina Faso and
Ivory Coast, then combining with the White Volta River and flowing into Lake Volta
in Southeastern Ghana.40 Existing hydroelectric facilities on the Black Volta River
includes Akosombo and Kpong hydroelectric projects, located approximately 150
km downstream and southeast of the Bui Project.
Currently, the primary sources of electricity generation in Ghana are hydropower,
thermal power and imported fossil fuel. Ghana's existing installed electricity
capacity is 1,760 megawatts (MW); of which 1,180 MW are from hydroelectricity
sources and 550 MW are from thermal plants. In addition to the above sources,
there is a 30 MW diesel plant at Tema, currently operated only as a contingency.41
The Akosombo and the Kpong dams in southeastern Ghana currently generate 67
percent of Ghana's electrical power, with the country also relying on imports from
Cote d'Ivoire to supplement domestic supply during peak hours. According to the
2002 Census report, roughly 43 percent of the national population has access to
electricity, and over 80 percent of the domestic electricity supply is consumed in
Ghana's cities and urban towns. 42 Table 3.0 below shows Ghana's plants and
respective electricity capacities.
40 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project.
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
41 See Energy Commission of Ghana, 2006, Energy Supply to the Economy - Electricity, Strategic
National Energy Plan, 2006-2020, Volume II, Part 1.
42 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
Table 3.0 total electricity and plant capacities in Ghana
NAME OF PLANT INSTALLED CAPACITY
Akosombo Hydro Plant 1020
Kpong Hydro Plant 160
Total Hydro Plant 1180 (67% of total)
Aboadze Thermal Plant 550
Tema Diesel Plant 30
Total Thermal/Diesel 580 (33% of total)
TOTAL 1760
Source: Electricity Sector Overview (Energy Commission of Ghana, 2006)
Long-term energy forecasts indicate that Ghana needs 100 MW of additional
capacity every two years,43 a projection that has resulted in plans to construct the
Bui dam. Sir Albert Kingston, an Indian-born-Australian educated geologist who
happened to discover the Akosombo gorge on April 24, 1915 while he was on a
canoe voyage down the Volta River and the Black Volta River, also discovered the
Bui gorge.44 The above gorge was targeted for the construction of the Bui
hydroelectric dam in 2007, by the government of Ghana.
3.2 Land Law and Land Use Rights in Ghana
The state, a stool (a skin), a clan, a family, an individual (including a corporate body)
or a group of individuals are the owners of Ghana's Land. The stool referred to as
such among most of the Akan ethnic groups in the southern Ghana) or skin (used
among the ethnic groups in Northern Ghana) constitutes the sovereign authority of
traditional areas in Ghana. Stool or skin lands were traditionally acquired by
43 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project.
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
44 See James Moxon (1969) Volta: Man's Greatest Lake.
conquest of previously occupied lands or by original occupation or settlement of
virgin land. Under the 1992 constitution of Ghana 45, "All Stool lands in Ghana shall
vest in the appropriate Stool on behalf of and in trust for the subject of the stool".
Clans and families typically acquire land by occupation or by gift. Individuals
acquire land by occupation as subjects of stools, members of clans or families, by
purchase or by gifts, while corporate bodies mostly by purchase and sometimes by
gift.46 The state on the other hand acquires land, compulsorily for public purposes or
in the interest of the public. 47
45 Article 267(1), of the 1992 Ghana constitution.
46 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project.
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
47 Article 20 (1) of the 1992 constitution provides that: no property of any description, or interest in
or right over any property shall be compulsorily taken possession of or acquired by the state unless
the following conditions are satisfied: -
(i) The taking of possession or acquisition is necessary in the interest of defense, public safety,
public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning or the development
or utilization or property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit; and
(ii) The necessity for the acquisition is clearly stated and is such as to provide reasonable
justification for causing any hardship that may result to any person who has an interest in or
right over the property.
Article 20 (2) states that compulsory acquisition of property by the state shall only be made under
law which makes provision for: -
(i) The prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation; and
(ii) A right of access to the high court by any person who has an interest in or right over the
property whether direct or on appeal from any other authority, for the determination of his
interest or right and the amount of compensation to which he is entitled.
Article 20 (3) of the 1992 constitution provides that where a compulsory acquisition or possession of
land effected by the state in accordance with article 20 (1) of this article involves displacement of any
inhabitants, the state shall resettle the displaced inhabitants on suitable alternative land with due
regard for their economic well-being and social and cultural values. The constitution further provides
that any property compulsorily taken possession of or acquired in the public interest or for a public
purpose shall be used only in the interest or for the purpose for which it was acquired.
3.3 Customary Land Ownership in the Bui Dam Area
The Bui Dam project area is mostly located within the Brong Ahafo and Northern
Regions of Ghana, and fall within the Mo traditional area and includes several skins,
among them the Bamboi, Talisma, and Carpenter etc. Members of the land-owning
skins and families have customary freehold 48, while migrants and other non-
members of the land owning skins and families access land through the various
traditional methods such as renting and share cropping.49
The actual dam area lies within the Bui National Park, which was declared a reserve
and vested in the state pursuant to the Wildlife Reserve Regulations of 1971 (L.I 701
of 1971). The Bui National Park constitution did not make any provision for the
payment of compensation when the land was acquired for the park. However, in
order for the dam to be constructed, the land will have to be re-acquired to ensure
the prompt compensation payment.
In order to avoid repeating the mistakes made by the Volta River Authority (VRA)5 0
resettlement schemes in the Volta Lake, where occupiers were not granted any
defined property rights, the Bui Power Authority (BPA)S1 involved the Lands
48 Families with customary freehold are the original owners of the land forever.
49 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
50 The government of Ghana through Act 46 of the Volta River Development Act in 1961 established
the Volta River Authority (VRA). Act 46 established VRA as the statutory corporation to oversee the
construction of the Akosombo dam and generation of electricity. The VRA also oversaw the
construction of the Kpong dam.
51 The President of Ghana established Bui Power Authority (BPA), in 2008, to oversee the
construction and generation of electricity at Bui.
Commission and the Lands Valuation Board in the planning and development of the
resettlement locations. The Lands Commission will register and grant proper titles
to the occupiers, and the Lands Valuation Board will undertake the valuation of
properties within the area to enable payment of compensation to those who will be
displaced by the Bui dam project.
3.4 Demography of Bui Dam Area
The area to be affected by the Bui dam projects comprises of approximately 2000
people living in small villages scattered all over the dam area,52 the villages are all
located in the Tain district and Bole Districts of Ghana. They are Bator, Bui village,
Dam site village, Dokoyina, Agbegikuro, Brewohodi, Lucene/Loga, Agbelikame South
Agbelikame North, Banda Ahenkro, Gyama, Banda Nkwanta, New Longoro,
Carpenter, Teselima, Bamboi, Bongasi, Saaman, Kwame Kwesi Wasipe, Alfred
Village, Tainaboi, Dodovi, Mempeasem and Tina. Out of the total affected villages,
seven will require physical resettlement due to inundation from the dam. The above
seven villages have a total population of 869 residents in 168 households, while four
other villages will lose land only.5 3 Table 3.1 below shows villages in the Bui dam
project area.
52 Remarks by Hon. Joseph Kofi Adda, Ghana's minister of energy at the Bui dam sod cutting
ceremony on August 24, 2007.
53 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
Table 3.1 villages in the project area
Tain District Bole District
Villages that will be Inundated or isolated by the dam
Bator Lucene/Loga
Bui Agbegikro
Dam Site
Brewohodi
Dokokyina
Villages that will lose some of their farmland due to inundation
Bongase Gyama
Banda Ahenkro Banda Nkwanta
Villages along the proposed transmission line or roads to be upgraded
New Longoro
Carpenter
Teselima
Bamboi
Gyama54
Downstream Villages that are likely to be affected by changed river flows
Agbelikame South Agbelikame North
Abofoakure/Ahomansia Alfred Village
Obaa Akurase Tainaboi
Mempeasem
Dodovi
Source: Environmental Resource Management
Resettlement portends to be complicated, as the villages are made up of a mixture of
populations that migrated from both north and south of Ghana to settle in the area,
54 Gyama will experience both inundations of farmland as well as impacts from road upgrade and
transmission lines.
_ _
The villages are made up of a variety of ethnic groups and religions, the education
level in the area is very low and majority of residents are present all year round,
though 53 villagers reported they are absent at least three months each year.55ss
Majority of the households in the area engage in farming and fishing as their
primary source of occupation. All the households in Dam site village rely on the
majority of their crop for subsistence purposes as well as their livestock, suggesting
that these households are very reliant on farmland (for crops and grazing) for
supply of food. Table 3.2 below shows household population of villages in the Bui
dam area and the level of impact that the dam project will have on each village
Table 3.2 village population and household numbers
Village Population Number of Average number of
Households people per household
Villages that will be inundated or isolated by the dam
Bator 670 45 15
Bui 350 40 9
Dam Site 42 5 8
Brewohodi 64 15 4
Dokokyina 350 55 6
Lucene/Loga 44 6 7
Agbegikro 190 16 12
Villages that will lose some of theirfarmland due to inundation
Bongase 2000 347 6
Banda Ahenkro 4000 Unknown Unknown
Gyama 1500 154 10
Banda Nkwanta 2,096 259 8
55 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
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Village Population Number of Average number of
Households people per household
Kwame Kwesi 351 40 9
Wasipe 300 20 15
Villages along the proposed transmission line or roads to be upgraded
New Longoro N/A N/A N/A
Carpenter N/A N/A N/A
Teselima 1000* N/A N/A
Bamboi 13,000* N/A N/A
Gyama 1500 154 10
Downstream villages that are likely to be affected by changed river flows
Agbelikame (South) 209 26 8
Abofoakure/ 115 28 4
Ahomansia
Obaa Akurase 34 7 5
Agbelikame (North) 702 70 10
Alfred Village 20* N/A N/A
Tainaboi 205 11 19
Mempeasem 30 5 6
Dodovi 20* N/A N/A
*=Estimated, Source Environment Resources Management
Fishing is used primarily for sale in the peak season and for subsistence in the lean
season. In addition to fishing and farming, households engage in a variety of
activities including tree cropping, livestock-rearing, hunting and gathering forest
products to help supplement their core livelihood activities. The unemployment
levels in Bui, Lucene and Agbegikuro are very high, meaning these people may face
great difficulty in restoring their livelihoods when resettled. The non-existence of
services such as electricity, water and sanitation infrastructure forces these
44
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households to rely on wood and kerosene for energy and hand pumps or the river
for drinking water. Infrastructure for treating both solid and liquid waste is not
available in these areas, and households usually rely on pit latrines or KVIP 5 6 for
their toilet needs. Table 3.3 below shows the villages that mostly rely on fishing as
their occupation.
Table 3.3 villages reliant on Fishing
Village Proportion (of total income from Proportion of fish that is
fishing (%) consumed and sold (%)
Brewohodi 80 Consumed: 40
Sold: 60
Dam Site 66 Consumed: 33
Sold: 66
Abofoakura/Ahomansia 60 Consumed: 20
(mix of farming)
Sold: 80
Mempeasem 60 Consumed 20
(Mix of farming) Sold: 80
Agbelekame North Less than 40 (although used to be the Consumed: 40
major income source)
(Mix of farming) Sold: 60
Agbegikro 80 Consumed: 20
Sold: 80
Source: Environmental Resources Management
Primary schools and healthcare facilities exist in some of the villages, but the
infrastructure is very limited forcing most villagers to travel to larger neighboring
56 The Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit (KVIP) is an upgraded form of the pit latrine, introduced to
help prevent the outbreak of epidemics such as cholera and diarrhea caused primary by pit latrines.
towns for these services. Households acquire lands by allocation from skins to build
their houses, which are mostly made of earthen with straw or tin roofs. The plots
vary in size, both within and between villages. Villagers have very few household
appliances or means of transport, both indications of high levels of poverty.57 Below
in figure 3.1 is a picture of a typical housing unit in Agbegikuro village in the Bui
dam area, and table 3.4 showing villages in the area with no schools.
Table 3.4 villages in Bui dam area with no schools
* Dam Site; * Obaa Akurase;
* Brewohodi; * Agbelikame North;
* Lucene; * Tainaboi; and
* Agbegikuro; * Mempeasem.
* Abofoakure/Ahomansia;
57 (2006). Environmental and Social Management Plan for the Bui Hydropower Project
Environmental Resources Management. ERM.
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Figure 3.1 below is a resident of Agbegikuro standing in front of his house.
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Income levels in Ghana vary according to regions, with people living in the capital
making the highest annual income than the rest of the 10 regions in the country.
Table 3.5 below shows the disparity in the mean annual household expenditure in
the Brong Ahafo Region and the Greater Accra Region, with Brong Ahafo's mean
annual household expenditure being 3,544,000 Ghana cedis and Accra's mean
annual household expenditure being 6,777,000 Ghana cedis.
Table 3.5 showing mean annual household and per capita expenditure and
mean annual mean annual household and per capita income.
Region Mean Annual Mean Annual Per Mean Annual Mean Annual Per
Household Capita Household Income Capita Income
Expenditure Expenditure (cedis) (cedis)
(cedis) (cedis)
Western 4,677,000 995,000 2,671,000 568,000
Central 2,977,000 902,000 1,464,000 444,000
Greater Accra 6,777,000 1,883,000 3,356,000 932,000
Volta 4,000,000 851,000 2,055,000 415,000
Eastern 3,736,000 958,000 1,950,000 527,000
Ashanti 5,008,000 1,221,000 2,550,000 622,000
Brong Ahafo 3,544,000 844,000 2,302,000 548,000
Northern 2,837,000 386,000 1,552,000 210,000
Upper West 2,462,000 352,000 1,442,000 206,000
Upper East 1,793,000 399,000 1,446,000 321,000
National 4,244,000 987,000 2,267,000 527,000
Source: Ghana Living Standards Survey, Report of the Forth Round
(GLASS4), Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000.
Table 3.6 Showing typical land use around a village in the project area.
3.5 Objectives
The most pressing question that arises in the discussion of the dam construction
asks' "Why do governments insist on constructing dams, when it has been proven
that dams more often than not result in the displacement of indigenous people and
cause severe environmental problems?" The Narmada dam's displacement of 40%
to 50 % tribal people in India alone since 1947 accounts for an estimated 33 million
indigenous people who make up 8% of India's 1 billion population.58 According to
58 Rajagopal, B. (2008, August 8). The Violence of Development.
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within the village
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the Indian Institute of Urban Affairs-New Delhi, the entire Narmada Valley Project
will lead to the eventual displacement of 1 million people, the majority of this
population belonging to tribal communities that have been marginalized by
mainstream development policies for decades.5 9 Yet most governments back their
plan to build hydroelectric dams with the economic argument that energy
independence could lead to development. The title of my thesis is named after the
recent romantic relation between China and other Sub Saharan African countries.
The ongoing Bui dam in Ghana will help me conduct detailed research on the above
topic.
Akosombo was financed and built using the World Bank standards, resulting in the
disaster described above. Hence it is necessary to study how the Chinese approach
dam construction different from that of the World Bank. The construction of the Bui
dam project began in early 2008, making it the perfect project to answer the
questions: "What standards are being used in the construction of the dam and why?
Are the best planning practices being incorporated into the project?" The success
and failure of the Three Gorges dam project depended largely on the success of the
resettlement implementation, and both the Chinese Communist Party and the State
Council considered resettlement to be a very important issue; hence they adopted
the "Development Settlement Policy," approach. The new approach included lump
sum reimbursement for lands lost to inundation, rural settlement, township and
59 See Claude Alvares and Ramesh Billorey (1998) Damming the Narmada: India's Greatest
Environmental Disaster. The World Network.
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factory relocation, personnel training and other issues pertinent to relocation. 60
According to Qing, pilot projects conducted showed that although it would be
difficult, overall resettlement in the Three Gorges area was environmentally
feasible. Given the lessons learned from the Three Gorges, will the Sino Hydro; a
Chinese company ensures that the social ramifications of the Bui dam project are
carefully and professionally resolved?
60 See Dia Qing (2006) The Dragon Has Come: The Three Gorges Dam and the Fate of China's Yangtze
River and its People.
Chapter Four
Planning Process and Social and Environmental Safeguards
This chapter presents an overview of the Bui dam, analyzing the planning process
adopted during the design stages of the project and the specific financial, technical
and engineering details of the Bui project. The planning process will focus on
analyzing the feasibility studies and social surveys undertaken by stakeholders
involved in the project.
4.1 Bui Dam Contract
The Ministry of Energy and the Bui Development Secretariat (BDS), both of Ghana
entered an agreement with China (the Export Import Bank of China and Sino Hydro)
on behalf of Ghana to build a hydroelectric dam at Bui that would generate 400
megawatts (MW) of electricity for the country.61 China committed to providing $1
billion in loans and grants towards the Bui Dam and other development projects in
Ghana. The agreement was broken into seven different financial packages covering
education, health, construction of the Bui dam, and areas of technical co-operation,
which would be determined later by the two parties 62 Five out of the seven
agreements were signed between the government of Ghana and the Chinese
government and the remaining two signed between Exim Bank of China 63 and the
government of Ghana. Institutions that will benefit from the assistance package are
61 See Ministry of Energy, Government of Ghana. www.energymin.gov.gh
62 See Daily Graphic. Thursday September 4, 2008. No. 150453. www.graphicghana.com
63 Exim - Export Import Bank of China.
the University of Ghana, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry
of Defense and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
The Bui hydroelectric dam project is strategically important to the country because;
* It reduces the dependence of the country on the purchase of imported fuel to
meet the power demand of the country.
* It stabilizes the load flow in the power system, especially in the northern part
of the grid.
* It reduces transmission losses on the power consumption of the northern
part of the country, presently supplied by production plants all located near
the coast.
* It participates in the long-term economic development of the country.
* It improves the technical capacity of Ghana to supply power to our neighbors
in Burkina Faso and Togo.
4.2 Technical and Engineering details of the Bui Dam
Coyne et Bellier a French company entered into an agreement with the Volta River
Authority (VRA) to update the feasibility study conducted by SMEC in 197664 on the
Bui Hydroelectric project on March 17, 1994. According to their report, the total
annual energy production required in Ghana to meet increasing domestic and
industrial loads will rise from 7,235 GWh to 11,953 GWh in 2020. In order to meet
64 Conducted by SMEC - Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation of Australia, 1976.
the peak demand, the installed capacity of the generation system will need to
increase from 1067 MW in 1997 to 1899 MW in 2020.65
The maximum generation capacity of the Bui dam is estimated to be 400MW with
net average production of 994-gigawatt hours/year (GWh/yr). The power output
from the Bui project will be primarily directed to the northern part of the national
grid through existing substations in Wa, Sunyani and Bolgatanga, with the
remaining power being transmitted to the southern grid. The Bui project will consist
of one main dam and a powerhouse in the Bui gorge and two saddle dams 66 in the
neighboring Banda hills, creating a reservoir that will extend about 40km upstream
within the borders of Ghana. 67 Below in figure 4.0 shows details of the dam and its
components.
65 Coyne et Bellier, February 1995, Bui Hydroelectric Development Feasibility Study Update
66 Saddle dam is a dam constructed between topographic low points along the sides of a reservoir to
prevent the reservoir from spilling out of the basin.
67 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
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The Dam will consist of the following:
* The main dam located in Bui gorge will be a gravity roller compacted
concrete (RCC) 68 dam, and its maximum height will be 110m above the
foundation level or 90m above ground level. The crest 69 of the dam used to
prevent spillage over the top of the dam caused by waves or rising reservoir
levels during floods will have a height of 185 m National Level Datum
(NLD) 70 and a total crest length of 470m. Incorporated in the design is an
emergency spillway and water intake to regulate and control flow of
upstream and downstream of the dam.
* The two saddle dams will be located at the low points along the Banda hills
southwest of the main dam to contain the reservoir. The first saddle dam will
be located along the right bank of the river 500m from the main dam at a
height of 37m AGL 71 and a crest height of 187m NDL. The second saddle dam
will be located on the right of the riverbank about 1km from the main dam
north of Bui Camp at a height of 7m AGL. Both saddle dams will be
constructed of rock fill material with a vertical drain on the downstream side
and an out let at the toe of the dam.7 2
68 Roller Compacted Concrete or RCC - A drier-than-typical concrete mix applied with high-density
paving equipment and compressed with rollers.
69 Crest height and length - Dam crest consist of a freeboard and parapet wall on the upstream side
of the dam, crest height is the maximum height if thee top arc if the dam and crest length is the linear
distance across the top arc of the dam.
70 NLD can be referred to as mean sea level. The ground level at the main dam site is approximately
96 National Level Datum (NLD).
71 AGL - Means above ground level.
72 Toe of the dam - The lowest point of the dam.
* The reservoir will have a Full Supply Level (FSL or Maximum Operating
Level) of 183 NLD. At FSL the reservoir will have a surface area of
approximately 440 square km, extending 40km upstream and inundating
21% of the Bui National Park, and will store 12.35 million cubic meters of
water with an average depth of 29m. The Minimum operating level (MinOL)
of the reservoir will be 167 NLD, with a reservoir total surface area of 288
square km and total volume of 6,600 million cubic meters. The maximum
level of the reservoir during flood would be 183.7m NLD (i.e. 0.7m above the
FSL).
* An indoor powerhouse made of concrete will be constructed along the left
bank of the river, approximately 20m downstream, containing three 133.MW
vertical shafts Francis-type turbines with a maximum power generation
capacity of 400MW.
* Three 161 kilovolts (kv) transmission lines will connect the Bui power
project with the national grid.73
Table 4.0 and 4.1 below shows the mean monthly inflows and projected average
water levels in the Bui reservoir respectively, and figure 4.1 and table 4.2
showing the detailed technical design of the dam.
73 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
Table 4.0 Monthly Mean Flows at Bui
Natural Flow m 3/s Regulated Flow m 3/s (1)
29.6 190.4
13.7 187.6
8.5 172.7
9.7 168.8
26.9 160.0
75.0 155.9
175.8 158.5
394.6 155.1
849.8 221.9
649.5 310.4
189.6 289.8
70.2 242.8
Percent Difference, %
+543
+1268
+1928
+1648
+495
+108
-10
-61
-74
-52
+53
+246
(1) Excluding spillway discharges during extreme flow events
Table 4.1 showing simulated average water levels in the Bui reservoir
Month Reservoir level
Jan 176.01
Feb 174.57
Mar 173.24
Apr 172.02
May 171.07
Jun 170.53
Jul 170.69
Aug 172.51
Sep 177.03
Oct 179.24
Nov 178.53
Dec 177.31
57 year minimum annual range 2.88
57 year average annual range 10.19
57 year maximum annual range 15.78
Source: Environmental Resources Management.
Month
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
June
July
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Table 4.2 technical details of the Bui dam project
DESCRIPTIONPROJECT FACILITY
MAIN DAM
Dam Type
Location
Crest Height
Crest Length
Dam Height Above Ground Level (AGL)
SADDLE DAM 1
Dam Type
Location
Crest Height
Crest Length
Dam Height AGL
SADDLE DAM 2
Dam Type
Location
Crest Height
Crest Length
Dam Height AGL
RESERVOIR
Full Supply Level (FSL, also referred to as Maximum
Operating Level or MaxOL)
Reservoir Area and Dimensions at FSL
Storage Volume at FSL
Minimum Operating Level (MOL)
ill
Gravity dam made of roller compacted concrete
Bui Gorge, 150 km upstream of Lake Volta
185 m National Level Datum (NLD); 186.1 m NLD with
flashboards and parapet wall
470 m
90 m AGL
Rock fill
Right bank of River, 500 m from main dam
187 NLD
300 m
37 m AGL
Zoned earth fill
North of Bui Camp along right bank of River,
approximately 1 km from main dam
187 NLD
580 m
7mAGL
183 m NLD
Area: 440 km 2 (21% of Bui National Park)
Length: 40 km
Average depth: 29 m
Total: 12,350 million m 3
Active: 6,000 million m 3
167.2 m
PROJECT FACILITY DESCRIPTION
Reservoir Area at Minimum Operating Level (MinOL) 288 km2
Storage Volume at MinOL Total: 6,600 million ms
POWERHOUSE
Turbine Number and Type 3 Francis turbines (133 MW each)
Location Left bank of River, 20m downstream of dam
Size of Powerhouse 90m X 19m
Maximum Generation Capability Maximum generation capability of 400 MW
Average Net Generation 980 GW h/yr
Source Coyne et Bellier, 2006
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Below is a figure 4.1 detail of the main dam.
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4.3 Financial details of the Bui contract
The Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Mr. Kwadwo Baah Wiredu of Ghana
and Mr. Fu Ziying, Vice Minister of Commerce of the People's Republic of China on
September 3, 2008 signed a contractual agreement for China to commit $1 billion in
loans and grants towards the Bui Dam project at the Osu Castle in Accra-Ghana, the
seat of Ghana's president. Out of the total amount, $526 million will be committed
towards the Bui dam project.74 The $526 million loan, known as the Buyer's Credit
Loan Agreement between Exim Bank of China and the government of the Republic of
Ghana, for the Bui project was laid in the House of Parliament before the
Parliamentary Finance Committee for consideration and approval on Tuesday July
24, 2007, in accordance with article 181 (3) of the 1992 constitution. The ,
government of Ghana also contributed $60 million towards the Bui dam project.
The loan was separated into two types of credits called Concessional Loan and
Buyers Credit, and their details are broken down below as follows:
CONCESSIONAL LOAN
Loan Amount US$270,000,000.00
Interest Rate 2% per annum (fixed)
Grace Period 5 years
Repayment Period 15 years
Maturity Period 20 years
Management Fee 0.30% flat
Commitment Fee 0.30% per annum
74 See Daily Graphic. Thursday September 4, 2008. No. 150453. www.graphicghana.com
BUYER'S CREDIT
Loan Amount US$291,680,137.00
Interest Rate CIRR* 107.5% (6.13%)
Grace Period 5 years
Repayment Period 12 years
Maturity Period 17 years
Management Fee 0.30% flat
Commitment Fee 0.30% per annum
Source: Parliamentary Finance Committee, July 26, 2007.
Due to the bilateral agreement between Ghana and China for the concessional loan,
it will not attract a guarantee or security, but it will be treated under full faith credit
of the Government of Ghana.75 On the other hand, Buyer's Credit will be treated as a
secured facility; hence to ensure security of its payment the following securities are
required:
* Escrow of net revenue from the Power Purchase Agreement
* Receivables from the sale of up to 30,000 tons of main crop and 10,000 tons
of light crop cocoa per annum to China under the Cocoa Sales Agreement
(CSA)
* Mortgage of the Land and Building, Equipment and Machinery of the Plant
* Insurance of the Loan by means of insurance policy in favor of lender
The loan agreement with China also required the ministry of energy to enter into a
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) for
the purchase of the energy to be generated from the Bui plant. Tentatively, the price
is set within the range of 3.5 - 5.5 US cents/KWh.
75 See Report by Ghana's Parliamentary Finance Committee (July, 2007), on the Buyer's Credit loan
between Ghana and Exim Bank of China.
The loan conditions with Exim Bank of China also required the Ghana Cocoa Board
and the Genertec International Corporation of Beijing to enter into a Cocoa Sales
Agreement (CSA) in which 30,000 metric tons of main crop Ghana cocoa beans
would be allocated to Genertec International Corporation per crop year as part of
measures to make cash available for the service of the debt. The Cocoa Sale
Agreement will be in force for a period of 20 years, lasting the entire time of the
loan.76
4.4 The Planning Process
Given the negative impacts that dams have on communities, the environment and
peoples' lives as result of flooding and inundation, it is necessary to invest
significant time and care into the planning stages. This is the time to ensure fair
treatment of residents and to specify the economic gains to be expected from the
project. In an interview with the CEO of Bui Power Authority (BPA), he stated that
what he wants to avoid in the Bui Project is a situation where people will curse at
him and drag his name in the mud in the future because he was the CEO of a dam
project that jeopardized lives.77 Mr. Lu of Sino Hydro the Chinese construction
company undertaking Bui project also expressed his concerns to me about how all
Chinese-related projects in the Ghana were being criticized and how they (Sino
Hydro) are determined to get the Bui dam project right.78 In haste to develop, many
76 See Report by Ghana's Parliamentary Finance Committee (July, 2007), on the Buyer's Credit loan
between Ghana and Exim Bank of China.
77 Interview with Fred Oware, CEO of Bui Power Authority in Accra.
78 Comment by Mr. Lu the director at Sino Hydro head office in Accra, when I was having a chat with
him during one of my visits.
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governments either ignore the importance of the planning process or refuse to
implement recommendations made as a result of Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) studies or social surveys, thus embarking on projects that result in fatalities to
life and property. It was not until 9 months into the construction of the Akosombo
dam that resettlement began to receive serious consideration, and 64,000 people
from over 700 communities were settled in 52 new communities in the Volta Basin.
The communities were provided with dwelling houses, sanitary facilities and
schools, but did not receive electricity until more than three decades after their
resettlement. Many of the problems of the resettlement were attributed to the
modernization approach, which led to the uncritical adoption of mechanized
farming to replace shifting cultivation, the lack of resources and poor planning,
adopted by the Volta River Authority.79 Alvares and Billorey argued that in return
for 400MW from the Sadar Sarovar and the Narmada Dam (on paper) and about 18
lakh hectares of irrigated fields (also vastly inflated to impress the Tribunal), the
Indian people are being asked to permit needless suffering to a population of over
300,000 including tribals, allow brutal and barbarous onslaught on vast wildlife
population and encourage the destruction of more than 100,000 hectares of forest
and agricultural lands, 80 which suggest that the government will do anything to
support their economic rhetoric for dam construction, even to the point of ignoring
findings from planning processes.
79 See Dodzi Tzikata (2006), Living in the Shadow of Large Dam: Long Term Responses of Down
Stream and Lakeside communities of Ghana's Volta Project.
80 See Claude Alvares and Ramesh Billorey (1998) Damming the Narmada: India's Greatest
Environmental Disaster.
The lack of planning during the design stages of dam constructions have resulted in
the creation of many man-made lakes and the displacement of poor people in many
parts of the world. Over 50,000 people were displaced by the Kariba dam, more the
70,000 people by the Akosombo dam and more than 100,000 people by the Aswan
High dam. In Africa, population movement as a result of displacement has been
primarily voluntary, since some people choose to remain in conditions perceived to
be unfavorable for various reasons. 81 However the proportion of involuntary
movement has been increasing as a result of government decisions, which
Ghanaians have no option but to obey. Reasons for the above decisions include
national security, the threat of epidemic disease, environmental degradation and
urban redevelopment as a result of engineering projects, and generally citizens have
no choice in the matter once a policy decision has been made for a compulsory
move.82
The lessons from the above problems of the Akosombo dam and other dam
constructions led to the adoption of an effective planning process during the design
stages of the Bui dam project. The Energy Ministry of Ghana contracted the
Environmental Resources Management (ERM) to conduct an Environmental and
Social Impact Assessment study of the Bui hydroelectric project in order to assess
the potential impacts associated with the construction of the Bui dam. The study
was expected to provide an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)
81 See Neville Rubin and William M. Warren (1968), Dams in Africa: An Inter-Disciplinary Study of
Man-Made Lakes in Africa.
82 See Neville Rubin and William M. Warren (1968), Dams in Africa: An Inter-Disciplinary Study of
Man-Made Lakes in Africa.
66
Report, Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) and a Resettlement
Planning Framework to be implemented during the actual construction of the dam.
As part of the planning standards for the Bui dam, the Ghanaian government
adopted the rules and regulations governing the use of IFC and World Bank
financing for development projects. The rules of International Finance Corporation
(IFC) Performance Standard 7 (PS7) on indigenous people, are a set of rules laid
down by the IFC to guide indigenous people on how to approach companies using
IFC loans to embark of development projects on customary lands that will affect the
lives of the indigenes. The p7 rules oblige companies seeking IFC funding to follow
specific IFC social and environmental rules, also known as performance standards.83
Companies that violate the PS7 rules or undertake projects that harm the lives or
customary lands and resources of indigenous people will not receive IFC funding if
the indigenous communities do not support and agree to the project.84
The PS7 rules essentially oblige companies using IFC funding to first carry out a
social and environmental assessment of their project's risks, and involve the
communities to be affected in an active planning process during the design stages in
order to ensure that community needs are addressed. The active participation of
communities from the design stages into the implementation stages and the
monitoring of the project itself are required by companies using IFC funding, and
83 See Forest Peoples Programme (October 1998), Indigenous People and World Bank Projects: A
Community Guide to the International Finance Corporation's Performance Standards 7 on
Indigenous People (PS7). www.forestpeoples.org
84 See Forest Peoples Programme (October 1998), Indigenous People and World Bank Projects: A
Community Guide to the International Finance Corporation's Performance Standards 7 on
Indigenous People (PS7). www.forestpeoples.org
broad community support for the project is a requirement for IFC loan qualification.
Companies are also required to bring in experts from outside of the IFC to carry out
the SEA 85 with active participation from the community, in situations where the
project to be undertaken is perceived as harmful to traditional lands and the
community is required to mutually agree on the commencement of a harmful
project process, which the IFC calls "Good Faith Negotiation."86 Indigenous people
are also required to create the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) if their
communities will be harmed by through project, and the companies are required to
create an Action Plan that include the IPDP, which the companies must respect at all
time hence they risk losing IFC funding. The P7 also requires engaging in active
participation with indigenous people using the good faith negotiation process, in
order to successfully draw a resettlement plan incase of displacement as a result of
the project.
With the entire financing of the Bui dam project coming from Exim Bank of China,
the construction being undertaken by Sino Hydro a Chinese company and the host
nation being Ghana, it is clear that the World Bank and the IFC had no involvement
on the project. Such a situation normally gives the stakeholders involved in the
project the opportunity to design and implement the project using their own
standards without any international rule or regulation binding them on issues such
85 SEA - Social and Environmental Assessment
86 See Forest Peoples Programme (October 1998), Indigenous People and World Bank Projects: A
Community Guide to the International Finance Corporation's Performance Standards 7 on
Indigenous People (PS7). www.forestpeoples.org
as planning and implementation. The poor management of the Akosombo dam by
the Ghanaian government and the World Bank five decades ago, and the fact that the
Three Gorges dam in China resulted in the submergence of over 17,000 hectares of
arable land and 7,000 hectare of orchards, eliminating the livelihoods of tens of
thousands of farmers,87 does not imply that failure is inevitable for the Bui dam
project. The Bui dam project actually presents the opportunity for the two countries
to prove that they have learned from their past mistakes and that it is indeed
possible to sustainably build a hydroelectric dam by applying the necessary
planning strategies from the beginning.
The Three Gorges dam resulted in the submergence of 624 factories including six
major factories in Chongqing, adding to the countries unemployment rate, and
embarked on forced displacement and inadequate compensation. Can Sino Hydro a
Chinese company, definitely be trusted to use the lessons learned from the Three
Gorges to handle a similar project in an effective and professional manner, without
any abuse of indigenous peoples rights? Given the lack of technical and financial
capacity on the part of the Ghanaians, how will they ensure the effective monitoring
of Sino Hydro?
The Ghanaian Ministry of Energy in an effort to ensure a sustainable dam
construction after the Akosombo experience, drafted a Terms of Reference (TOR)
containing guidelines on how the Bui Hydroelectric Power Project Environmental
87 See A Publication of ECA - Watch (September 2003), Race to the Bottom, Take II: An Assessment
of Sustainable Development Achievements of ECA - Supported Projects Two Years After OECD
Common Approaches Rev 6.
and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) study should be done, in a contract signed
with Environmental Resources Management (ERM) the company responsible for
carrying out the ESIA in December 2005. The TOR ensured that the Environmental
Impact Study carried out by ERM conformed with Ghana's environmental legislation
as well as Environmental Impact Assessment procedures of international financial
institutions, in particular the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the
World Bank (WB).88 Thus the Ghanaian government ensured that the planning
standards of Ghana and of the IFC and the World Bank were integrated into the
design and implementation of the Bui project. Though the Bui project is not being
undertaken with the World Bank's financial support, the Ghanaian government
ensured that the project would be carried out in compliance with international best
practice by mandating the ESIA to be implemented according to the policies,
safeguard procedures and guidance of the World Bank Group.
The World Bank screens projects based on their possible environmental impacts
and classifies them as A, B or C (A being the most potentially adverse and C being
the least). A hydroelectric power development is normally classified as a Category
"A" project, owing to the potentially significant adverse environmental and social
impacts, and this triggers a full environmental assessment. The World Bank in its
Environmental Assessment Sourcebook publicly provides detailed advice and
guidance on the conduct of environmental assessment.
88 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
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Below are several of the project elements that the World Bank safeguard policies
seek to examine in communities where development projects are being undertaken.
* Environmental Conditions
* Natural Habitats
* Forestry
* Pest Management
* Cultural Property
* Indigenous Peoples
* Involuntary Resettlement
* Safety of Dams
* Projects in International Waters
* Projects in Disputed Areas
In order to ensure that all the above elements were met during the planning stages
of the Bui project, broad feasibility studies and social surveys were conducted
throughout the Bui dam project area and the entire country. Environmental
Resources Management (ERM) and the Bui Development Secretariat (BDS) now
known as the Bui Power Authority (BPS) were responsible for the studies.
4.5 Social Surveys
A team of six specialist students from the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science
and Technology and University of Cape Coast all in Ghana conducted detailed social
surveys in the Bui project area regarding the dam to be constructed, for a period of
five weeks. The methodology used in collecting primary data by the team of experts
consisted of focused group discussion and semi structured interviews. The students
went from house to house and interviewed everyone, using very detailed
questionnaires to guide their interviews, and the responses from the residents were
recorded in detail. Part one of the survey targeted chiefs and village elders, and
asked questions such as name of village, name of resident, historical profile of
resident, demography/general profile, administration/ leadership, local
economy/livelihoods, forest resources/land ownership, potential effect of the Bui
dam project, resettlement (for communities to be resettled only) and key social
problems and development issues.
Part two, targeted farmers both men and women and focused on the profiles of
people engaged in farming, farming inputs, flooding (discussed in villages that are
downstream from the dam site), land tenure and use, livestock, gathering of non-
timber forest products, market/transportation/supply chain, challenges to farming,
social problems and development issues and potential effects of the Bui dam project.
Part three targeted the fishing community and focused on general profile, location
and availability of fish, fishing methods, fishing supply chain, challenges, livelihood
and potential effects of the Bui dam project, resettlement (for communities to be
settled) and key social and development issues. Part four of the interview targeted
the hunting community and asked questions like general profile of hunters, hunting
location, techniques and availability, animals hunted, non-timber forest products,
livelihood and potential effect of the Bui dam project and key social problems and
development issues. Part five targeted women (including health) and focused on
issues like quality of life, occupation/livelihood, health, morbidity, mortality,
lifestyle, healthcare facilities - quality and access, livelihood and potential effect of
the Bui dam, resettlement (for communities to be resettled only) and key social
problems and environmental issues.
Part six targeted small fishing and farming villages including chief and residents
(men and women) and focused on issues like such as historical profile, demography,
administration/leadership, local livelihoods, fishing profile, location and availability
of fish, fishing supply chain, farming, flooding, non timber products, livelihood and
potential effects of the Bui dam project, resettlement and key social problems and
development issues. Part seven targeted teachers and the focus was demography,
key social and development issues, status of education, village infrastructure/village
property and potential effects of the Bui dam project. Traders were interviewed
about their general profile, supply chain, competition, trade challenges, attitude
towards the Bui project, resettlement and key social problems and development
issues. Charcoal burners were asked about their general profile, sources and
marketing, availability of raw materials, attitude towards the dam project and key
social problems and development issues.89
The Bui Development Secretariat and the Environmental Resources Management
also conducted nation wide and local meetings to discuss the ESIA of the Bui power
project. One of the above national meetings known as Nationwide Stakeholders
Meeting was held in Accra on April 25, 2006, involving 121 participants from NGOs,
the media, the public service, academia and the private sector to discuss the
potential environmental and social impacts of the Bui power project and how they
should be addressed.90 Several local public hearings were also held in the Bui dam
project area, to inform interest groups about the project, determine issues of
particular concern and provide feedback on the findings of the ESIA. On August 28,
2006 public hearings were held with the chiefs and residents of Banda Ahenkro and
Bungasi in the Brong Ahafo Region to discuss the above agenda.
4.6 Feasibility Studies
The Environmental Resources Management (ERM) also conducted technical
feasibility studies on the main Bui dam known as the Environmental and Social
Management Plan (ESMP). The studies focused on issues of detailed design issues,
dam safety, operating time of the project, site preparation, wildlife rescue,
construction management, employment of workforce, worker code of conduct,
employment policies, community support measures, the Bui National Park
89 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
90 See Bui Development Secretariat and Environmental Resources Management (April 25, 2006): A
Report on The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment of the Bui Hydropower Project.
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Management Plan, Watershed Management Plan, Monitoring Program, healthcare
provision, relocation and resettlement and compensation.
Chapter Five
Analysis of the Bui Dam Project
This chapter will use both secondary data gathered during the course of my
research and primary data from my fieldwork to analyze the impact of the Bui dam
project on the people affected, Ghanaian energy and economic prospects and more
broadly the Ghana - China development relationship. However, because the
construction of the Bui dam project started in 2007 and is scheduled to be complete
2012, it should be noted that the project is still in the progress and my analysis will
not be able to assess the actual implementation of all safeguards as yet to be carried
out. Due to timing of my thesis, I will focus more on ERM's analysis and the current
aspects of the project that are being addressed by Sino Hydro and Bui Power
Authority (BPA) as of now, since I have concrete data on the details.
The ESIA conducted prior to the Bui dam Project, raised a lot if concern about the
lives of the people in the Bui community that needs to be addressed in order to
reduce the impact of the project on both the local community and the country. The
most pressing issues revealed by the environmental and social impact assessment
studies in addition to economic development that needs to be addressed to ensure
the smooth running of the project are as follows:
* Displacement, Resettlement and Compensation
* Bui National Park
* Environmental Impact
* Labor
* Economic Impact
* Social Impact
* Alternative Sources of Energy
* Impact on China - Ghana Relationship
Each of the above is addressed, in turn, below.
5.1 Displacements and Resettlement
The Bui project is estimated to affect over 2000 people in living in the area, either
through direct inundation by the dam, loss of farmland due to inundation,
displacement due to transmission lines or road construction and charged rivers
causing displacement downstream as shown in figure 1.2 above. Most of the
residents in these villages will lose their livelihood of either farming, fishing or
hunting, hence the need to intervene and help them get their lives back together.
The Bui Power Authority (BPA) and Sino Hydro, with the help of the Ghanaian
government, took up the task to ensure smooth relocation and payment of
compensation to the affected residents. Below in table 5.0 is the Ghanaian law on
displacement and the World Bank's policy on involuntary settlement.
Table 5.0
Government of Ghana requirement for displacement
Under Ghanaian law, the 1992 Constitution provides that where a compulsory
acquisition or possession of land affected by the State involves displacement of any
inhabitants, the State shall resettle the displaced inhabitants on suitable alternative
land with due regard for their economic well-being and social and cultural values
Objectives of the World Bank Involuntary Resettlement Policy (OP 4.12)
According to the World Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement (OP
4.12) involuntary resettlement may cause severe long-term hardship,
impoverishment, and environmental damage unless appropriate measures are
carefully planned and carried out. For these reasons, the overall objectives of
OP4.12 are the following:
a) Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or minimized,
exploring all viable alternative project designs.
b) Where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, resettlement activities should be
conceived and executed as sustainable development programs, providing
sufficient investment resources to enable the persons displaced by the project to
share in project benefits. Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted
and should have opportunities to participate in planning and implementing
resettlement programs.
c) Displaced persons should be assisted in their efforts to improve their livelihoods
and standards of living or at least to restore them, in real terms, to pre-
displacement levels or to levels prevailing prior to the beginning of project
implementation, whichever is higher.
Source: Environmental Resources Management
In order to ensure smooth resettlement in the area, Ghana Lands Commission has
been working in the area to ensure that proper land titles are issued to land owners
in the area, while the Lands Valuation Board is engaged in detailed crop and
property valuation in the affected areas to determine the fair market value for crops
that will be lost in the area.91 The above process will to take some time to complete
91 I conducted a detailed interview with Bui Power Authority's Environmentalist on the project site.
He is the person in charge of organizing meetings and public hearings in the dam area, to discuss
issues relating to relocation and compensation and also served as the direct communication between
residents and BPA head office in Accra. The BPA has a camp on the project site for its staff, where
they conduct quality control work and also serve as a communication point for the residents incase
there is a problem. BPA's entire staffs are engineers or university graduates from the elite
universities in the country, and were living in air-conditioned mobile homes with 3-course meal
being provided everyday. Sino Hydro also had a camp on site to house both the Chinese and
due the poor nature of the area of operation; poor road network coupled with lack
of modern survey equipments at the disposal of the Lands Valuation Board.
Meanwhile some villages were directly affected as soon as construction of the dam
began in the area in 2007. As of July 2008, Sino Hydro has been undertaking rock
blasting and river diversion at the project site to enable the construction of the main
dam. The movement of heavy duty trucks on site and loud noise from the rock
blasting makes it very risky for residents of Brewohodi, Lucene, Agbekikuro and
Dam site village to live in their houses and go about their normal business, because
they are actually located on the construction site as shown in figure 4.0 above.
The BPA and Sino Hydro, thus decided to relocate the above-mentioned villages
before construction began, so the BPA held several public hearings to inform
residents of these villages about the displacement and discussed resettlement plans
with them on several occasions. Residents of the above villages are not indigenous
people, they are migrants who had migrated to farm, fish and live in the area for a
long time. They either migrated from the south as fishermen or the north as farmers
to the area and were giving lands by the Gyama traditional council to live and farm
on, so technically speaking they are not original land owners even though they have
been living in the area for decades. Displacing them without any effort by the
government to resettle them elsewhere will be problematic, since they have
Ghanaians working for the company. The Chinese were mostly engineers and the Ghanaians were
unskilled or semi skilled laborers operating the construction machines on site. The Ghanaian
laborers were recruited and working directly under Sino Hydro, hence the Ghanaian staff of BPA had
no involvement in their working conditions, leaving the Chinese to run the show and they were
mostly housed in abandoned classrooms, where 14 to 20 people slept in one room with no air
condition to prevent mosquito bites.
nowhere to go to. Prompting the government to acquire a piece of land from the
Gyama traditional council downstream to be used for the resettlement site, and
constructed solid block houses, provided KVIPs and drilled a borehole to provide
good drinking water. Officials of BPA organized meetings and took the victims to the
resettlement site while the houses were under construction to show then around
and share their opinion about the facilities at the new place.
The residents in these villages have been living in houses made of mud and thatch,
where each family or household had his or her own separate compound from other
families, with no toilet facilities and they were drinking directly from the Black Volta
River. Below in figure 5.0 are two pictures of the same family standing in front of
their old mud house at Brewohodi just before moving to their new house at the
resettlement site, and a picture of their new resettlement house at Gyama showing
the improvement in housing construction.
Figure 5.0 old and new house of one family
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The residents agreed to relocate to the new site, only if they will also be provided
with parcels of land to farm and the fishermen also requested to be allowed to fish
upstream of the dam. With the help of the Gyama chief, the government was able to
acquire parcels of farmlands at Gyama and allocated it to the relocated villagers to
be used for farming. As of August 2008, engineers from BPA were surveying the
acquired farmlands in order to properly demarcate boundaries for each resident to
avoid future conflict. Until the above process is completed the residents are just
farming on the land.
5.1.1 Resettlement Housing Formula
The BPA adopted a housing design standard that ensured that every household or
family enjoyed the privacy that they were used to in their old villages. In the old
villages, families had their own houses surrounded by a piece of land and most
people had two bedroom mud houses. In order to maintain that level of privacy, all
the houses constructed for resettlement were two bedroom houses with a
compound surrounding them, hence families that owned either two bedrooms or
one bedroom were given a full two-bedroom house each, just to avoid
confrontations in the future. BPA also provided trucks to help transport the
belongings of every family from their villages to the resettlement site and for
documentation purpose, all the households were photographed in front of their old
house on the last day of relocation and on the first day at the resettlement site.92
92 The BPA environmentalist also stated that the resettlement exercise was very quiet and peaceful,
mainly because the people currently being resettled are migrants to the area and he anticipates
5.1.2 Compensation
Every member in each household was given 50 Ghana cedis during the first week of
arrival at the resettlement site in Gyama, so if there is a household with five
members the total amount received by that household will be 250 Ghana cedis.
Another 50 Ghana cedi was distributed to every member of a household in the
second week. The purpose of the money is to help the residents clear their new
farmland to begin farming. In all, a total of 500 Ghana cedis will be paid to each
household member on installment basis to help them start either fishing or farming,
the villagers will be monitored to ensure that the money given them is used for its
purpose, hence if BPA authorities find out that a resident is using his/her money for
other purposes such as marriage of an extra wife that member will forfeit the
additional installment payable in the future. Below in figure 5.1 is a picture of the
BPA environmentalist making installment payments to the resettled residents at
Gyama; each person's thumbprint is taken to acknowledge receive of payment by
the BPA. Also is table 5.1 below, showing details of the total cost of relocation and
compensation at the Bui dam area.
bigger problems in the future when it comes to the resettlement of the indigenous people such as the
Bu village.
Table 5.1 showing estimated cost of relocation and compensation at Bui
Cost
Item US$ Assumption/Comment
1. Compensation for dwellings and
structures:
- Living quarters
812,939 The sum total of the estimated replacement value per m 2 multiplied by total
- Kitchen area of dwelling/structure.
81,966
- Other buildings
18,250
Total of above
913,155
2. Compensation for plantation 1,086,417 Based on an inventory of trees per affected household and market value per
trees variety, based on yields.
3. Compensation for house plot 6,996 Based on 740 trees valued at a maximum unit value of 86,650 Cedis. Assumes
trees all trees "mature".
4. Compensation for crops and lost i 88,267 Crop compensation based on an average crop value per farm, and market value
crop production per variety. For lost crop production, as outlined in Section 5, the government
is required to pay a displacement cost in addition to replacing land. The
average income earned in a good month from farming is 600,000 cedis. It is
assumed that, as an upper bound estimate, this income is lost to each
household for a period of 8 months (i.e. time between last crop and
commencement of project-related employment).
5. Compensation for traders 5,000 Indicative estimate is based on employment in trading as reported in the social
survey for 49 people engaged in trading activities.
6. Transportation allowance 33,600 A transportation allowance of $200 per household
..... ' I ..... ....................................................... ....................  .  .. ..u r  e y n . e ..... . t.  .... a  ... n .a.n. d -r. e g is...ra......n .f ......
7. Site Planning 84,000 Surveying, land use assessment, master plan, demarcation and registration of
plots in consultation with resettlement committee. Assumes a cost of $500 per
household.
8. Compensation for public 77,383 An estimate was derived by taking the maximum unit value for a structure
structures (assumes sandcrete block construction), and multiplying it by the total area for
the structures documented in the community assets survey. Schools, and
churches are reported on here. The figure includes an estimate for the school
in Agbegikuro, which was not documented in the community assets survey.
9. Construction or upgrading of 125,000 Infrastructure could include wells and latrines for improved water and
infrastructure sanitation services, and generators for improved energy supply. Provision will
need to be made for installing as well as maintaining infrastructure.
Identification of host sites is necessary to determine budget. An indicative
estimate is presented here.
10. Compensation for relocation of 10,500 Assumes $1500 cost per village to relocate religious sites
religious property/graveyards
11. Livelihoods Enhancement 1,175,625 This figure includes programme costs, staff salaries, overheads, and capacity
Program building/training. See Section 9.4 for greater detail on this programme.
Doug: NotI
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Cost
Item US$ Assumption/Comment
transparent
12. Ongoing Monitoring (NGO) 60,000 Quarterly monitoring for twelve quarters @ $5,000 per quarter.
13. External Evaluation 200,000 Three evaluations.
Subtotal 3,685,943
Contingency 368,594 10% of sub-total
Total 4,054,537
Source: Environmental Resources Management
ure 5.1-installment payment to resettled residents
The BPA also provided free training skills in new methods of farming, fishing,
trading and construction to the residents, in order to help them modernize their
occupation and make them more self-sufficient. Meanwhile the BPA is also waiting
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on the Lands Valuation Board to complete its valuation of crops and property that
has been lost by the villages already resettled in order to compensate them based on
the valuation figures, since the residents have been prohibited from visiting their
old farms situated on the dam site. Below in figure 5.2 is a picture showing some of
the meetings held by BPA and Sino Hydro to discuss resettlement and other issues
bothering the Bui area residents as a result of the dam construction.
Figure 5.3 BPA surveyors at a farmland at Gyama
5.2 Bui National Park
The Ghana Wildlife Division is the agency in charge of managing the Bui National
Park. It has fulltime staff that carry out maintenance and surveillance activities to
prevent people from hunting the animals in the park and its headquarters is located
at the Bui Camp in the southernmost portion of the park. The Bui National Park is
the only protected area in Ghana with large components of undisturbed riverine
forest associated with wooded savannah,93 but it is still the least developed
protected area in the country.
93 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
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The park serves as home for several species of wildlife, insects, small mammals,
bats, birds, reptilians and large mammals. In total about 80 species of wildlife found
in the park are classified as of conservation concern internationally and also
protected under Ghana's Wildlife Law, see appendix 1 for a list of species of
conservation concern found at the Bui National Park. Nineteen of the 80 species are
considered to be of conservation concern (IUCN Vulnerable, Near Threatened or
Conservation Dependent), with all the species of concern falling under the 3 types of
classification below:
1. World Conservation Union (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species (IUCN
2004)
2. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
3. Draft Ghana Wildlife Act (2005), comprising of a list of nationally protected
species.
The key concern of the large mammals in the Bui National Park are the
hippopotami, since IUCN Red-Listed them as the most endangered species with
regard to the Bui dam project due to their limited distribution in the country and
West Africa (about 7,000 remain in the region).
The Bui national park is documented to have a population of 305 hippos, with a
mean of 2.11 hippos per kilometer based on the hippos seen in each section of
the river. There are 13 different hippo pools evenly distributed between the
southern and northern portion of the Black Volta River, and all the pools will be
inundated as a result of the dam construction. Below in figure 5.4 is a picture of
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hippos spotted in the Black Volta River. The Bui dam project will inundate a
large portion of the Bui National park (21%) resulting in the eradication of most
of the species that have been protected from hunters by the parks guards. Hence,
the need to design a comprehensive plan to protect the lives of these animals in
the park, but the Wildlife Division of Ghana has never placed a high priority on
the preparation of a development and implementation of a protected area plan
(PAMP) for the Bui National Park. So how will the Wildlife Division handle the
impact of the Bui dam development on the Bui National Park? The ESIA study
conducted was able to reveal the impact that the Bui dam will have on the park
as the first step to addressing the problem. Below in figure 5.5 is a map showing
the inundated areas of the dam and the exact location of hippo pools within the
reservoir.
Figure 3.4
Photo 14: Adult hippopotamus and calf in Hippo Pool #2.
Photo 15: Adult hippopotamus and calf in Hippo Pool #2.
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The Environmental Resources Management study suggested the adoption of a
comprehensive management plan by the Wildlife Division of Ghana, to engage in a
series of mitigation measures that can be most effectively coordinated under the
umbrella of a Protected Area Management Plan (PAMP) for the creation of an
extended Bui National Park.94 The PAMP should be implemented in close
coordination with contractor, the Bui Environmental and Social Management Plan
team and local authorities. However the Bui dam project is only required to finance
the cost of the parts of the PAMP implementation that relate to the Bui Project
mitigation, leaving the Wildlife Division to finance the remaining cost of park
extension at its discretion, based on biodiversity conservation priorities. The above
approach to the Bui National Park problem is not sustainable, given the fact that the
Wildlife Division is one of the poorest government agencies in the country and is
heavily understaffed with barely any capacity to handle this huge task of park
extension and evacuation. Raising the question of why the Ghanaian government
decided to pay more attention to displacement and relocation of the Bui residents,
through the use of international standards but did not do approach the
displacement of wildlife with the same level of expertise and care?
The park will be have to extended downstream of the dam site and most of the
animals especially the hippos will have to be relocated downstream to avoid
drowning during the flooding of the dam, but the present capacity of the Wildlife
Division shows that they cannot handle the relocation of the pools to accommodate
94 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
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the hippos and other endangered species within the park. As of August 2008, the
ESIA study had been presented to the Wildlife Division and the Ghana's
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with details stating the impact that the Bui
Dam will have on the Bui National Park and it surroundings. When I visited the EPA
head office in Accra to enquire about the Bui National Park, they admitted to have
received a copy of the ESIA prepared by ERM but had no plan on the table as to how
the animals and the park itself will be saved through the PAMP due to lack of
financial and technical capacity. The BPA and the Chinese contractor (Sino Hydro)
undertaking the dam project also had no plans for the endangered species, with
their concern mostly being the construction of the dam.
5.3 Environmental Impact
The environmental impact of the Bui dam project can be separated into three
different areas, namely the social impact, physical impact and the biological impact.
All the three categories above will have serious impacts on the lives of the
indigenous people and the migrants living in the area, hence the need to carefully
address them in order to minimize the impact.
5.3.1 Physical Impact
The Bui dam will create a reservoir occupying an area of approximately 440 square
km and flood 21% of the Bui National Park as shown in Figure 4.0 above. The
construction of saddle dams, powerhouse, switchyard, road upgrade and new
transmission lines from the site to Teselima, east Kintampo and Sunyani will also
result in further land take by the project. Land to be flooded by the projects is
mostly vegetative comprising of 50% grassland, 25% savannah woodland and 25%
water and riverine forest.95 The dam will also inundate six villages with a population
of 1,360 people and other villages will be required to relocate due to their current
location within the Bui National Park, and physical isolation by the reservoir with no
easy access to any part of Ghana, four other villages with a population of 7,500 will
lose access to their farmlands and forest.
About 85km of river bank will be lost since the reservoir will create about 500km of
reservoir shoreline, flow of the existing river will be captured in the reservoir and
released at a controlled rate for the generation of power causing downstream river
flows to even out, with reduced flood peaks between August and October and
increased low flows between December and June. The reduction in river flows
downstream will result in consequences that will affect aquatic and riverine habitats
and existing water users, fisheries and floodplain agricultural that depend on the
regular replenishment of nutrients from silt-laden floodwater will also be affected. 96
Figure 5.6 below shows an areal map of the entire Bui National Park and the
vegetative areas to be inundated by the reservoir.
95 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
96 See Environmental Resources Management (ERM), June 2006. www.erm.com
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5.3.2 Biological Impact
Studies have suggested that greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs due to
rotting vegetation and carbon inflows from the catchment may be a significant
source of global greenhouse gas emissions.97 Greenhouse gases mostly made up of
carbon dioxide and methane are released into the atmosphere from reservoirs that
flood forest and other biomass, either slowly of rapidly. The release of carbon
dioxide and methane are thought to contribute an estimated 7% of global warming
impact on human activities. 98 The Bui dam's impact on climate change will depend
on three factors; the influx rate, the total surface area of the reservoir and the
amount of biomass. With a surface area of 440 square km the Bui dam is not large
compared to other man-made lakes in Africa. According to Coyne et Bellier, the
carbon cycle impact as result of the Bui dam construction will be minor, hence there
is no need to expect a significant release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. By
comparison with the "cleanest" form of thermal power generation (combined cycle
gas turbine or CCGT) to the emissions from generating 1,000GWh/yr are small.99
5.3.3 Social Impact
The permanent displacement of over 1,400 people from their homes, the
displacement of about 9,000 peoples from their farms and forest, the loss of lands
and natural resources and loss of water will impact the economic life in the area and
increased health risks, putting more pressure on the inadequate infrastructure and
97 See World Commission on Dams, www.dams.org/report
98 See International Rivers Network: Greenhouse Emissions from Dams (2002)
99 See Coyne et Bellier and Environmental Resources Management (2006)
social services like schools and community centers and create unemployment unless
adequately addressed. The Dam will lead to loss of livelihoods and immovable
assets of the 7 villages to be inundated, farmers will also be losing crops and trees to
the floods, further impoverishing the them. Prior to the dam construction, families
were living in separate villages based on either their religion or ethnicity, but the
first resettlement site built adopted a holistic approach by putting all the families
into one single village without consideration ethnicity or religious differences.
The resettlement formula assumed that the residents can live together in peace
provided families have their separate compound, but there is a high risk of conflict
arising between the families in the future due to differences in religion and
ethnicity. According to the environmentalist on site, households were demanding
separate places of worship to practice their religion, thus Christians wanted a
church, Moslems wanted a mosque and the tribal people wanted their own shrine to
be built on the new settlement. Lack of financing forced the BPA to consider the
construction of one community center, so everybody can go and worship there,
which is risky because of the possibility of residents clashing on issues such as time,
space and noise in the future.
The standards for designing the integrated communities were set by the BPA in
consultation with Ghana Lands Valuation Board and the Planning Department. It
was obvious the BPA officers did not consult with the local residents before
embarking on the construction of the resettlement site, which explains why they are
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running into the problem of disagreement on a common place of worship for all the
residents.
5.4 Socio Economic Impact
The socio economic impact of the Bui dam project has a two-way dimension, local
impact and national and international impact.
5.4.1 Local Socio Economic Impact
On the local front, the construction of the Bui dam has resulted in the influx of about
2000 construction workers into the Bui dam area and majority of them are migrants
from surrounding villages of either the Brong Ahafo Region or the Northern Region,
which will definitely have an impact on the Bui resident communities. The migration
of these workers with different cultures into the dam area has created a lot of
tension between the locals and the outsiders, cultural differences are clashing
between the two groups and crime rate has definitely increased in the area as a
result of the casual migrant workers. The sudden population explosion of Bui dam
area villages like Banda, Bui village and Dam site village has led to an increase in
pressure on the already lacking infrastructure in these villages, such as healthcare,
toilet and transportation. The high number of male migrants into the area has also
mounted pressure on the women, as a result prostitution is surfacing in the
neighboring villages as some women take the advantage of the situation while the
men are willing to pay because they are living and working in the middle of a forest,
where the nearest big town close to the dam site is about 4 hours drive on a dirt
road with 2 mini buses making 2 trips each way a day. Hence, workers are not
motivated to travel out of the dam construction site unless there is an emergency.
Brong Ahafo Region produces about half of the countries foodstuff because of the
rich nature of their soil and the abundant rain they receive each year, but the
construction of the dam has resulted in majority of the youth in the region, ignoring
the farming profession and taking up unskilled jobs on the Bui dam site with Sino
Hydro. In the long run, the above situation will result in less food production in the
country as a result of decreased food supply coming from the Brong Ahafo Region
resulting in increase food prices in the country. However the flow of casual migrants
into the dam site area has led to the creation of jobs for women especially because
they cook food and sell them to the workers on site. Bu these women selling food to
the workers will be out of job by 2012 when the dam is completed and workers
move out of the villages in the dam area.
5.4.2 National and International Socio Economic Impact
Ghana has never been energy self sufficient, it has relied on electricity imported
from Cote d'Ivoire to supplement domestic needs during peak hours. The problem
was further exacerbated in 2006 through 2008 when the lack of rainfall and
siltation of the Akosombo dam caused the Volta River Authority and the Electricity
Company of Ghana to ration power through the load shedding scheme in the
country, in order to keep businesses running. Coyne et Bellier's study forecasted in
1995 that both domestic and industrial demand for energy in Ghana will rise from
7,235 GWh in 1997 to 11,953 GWh by 2020, hence the installed generation capacity
will need to increase from 1067 MW in 1997 to 1899 MW in 2020. Thus Ghana will
need an additional 100MW of electricity capacity every two years in order to be self
sufficient, supporting the need to build the Bui dam which is expected to generate
400MW of hydroelectric to help meet the above forecast.
Generating enough electricity will also mean that business and the industrial sector
can be assured of continuous power supply to run their operations, which will lead
to the creation of more jobs and economic activity of the country. The money spent
to import energy from Cote d'Ivoire can also be channeled to other sectors of the
economy such as healthcare, education and transportation since this sectors lack the
adequate investment needed in the 21st century. The excess electricity generated
will also be exported to neighboring countries of northern Togo and Burkina Faso
for foreign exchange, which can be used to help boost other sectors of the economy.
However, the cost of displacement and destruction to be caused by the Bui dam to
human lives, animals, property and the climate can outweigh all the benefits
anticipated from the project above. Dams and big projects have been perceived to be
the only way to attain economic success in developing countries, but they never
produce positive results in the long run due to either sustainability issues or poor
contractual agreement issues. The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) analysis
prepared by the independent Prayas Energy Group of India demonstrated that the
Bujagali Dam (Uganda) original agreement signed with U.S based AES Corporation
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fell short of international standards. Meaning Uganda will be faced with an average
of $20 million in excessive payments each year if the project moves on under the
current contract. 100 The above study by Prayas was only possible to conduct
because the Ugandan government released the contract document to the public.
Ghana, has also failed to release the turnkey contractual agreement signed between
Ghana and the Exim Bank of China on the Bui dam project to the general public,
making it nearly impossible to analyze the terms of the contract and actually see
what each country is getting from the project and why the Chinese are heavily
involved in all aspects of the project. It is interesting to note that most countries in
Sub Saharan Africa fail to adequately follow specific IFC guidelines and regulations
when undertaking developing projects with financing from the Bretton woods
Institutions, due to tough IFC requirements. Which has motivated the new
relationship between the Sub Saharan Africa countries and China known as the
"South-South relationship," the similar characteristics of these countries make it
easy for these kind of bilateral agreement to be signed, but who is gaining in the
long run and who will end up losing?
5.5 Impact on Labor
The ERM's environmental and social impact studies focused primarily on the impact
that the project will have on the environmental and the physical displacement of the
100 See ECA - Watch (September 2003), Race to the Bottom, Take II: An Assessment of Sustainable
Development Achievements of ECA - Supported Projects Two Years After OECD Common
Approaches Rev 6.
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residents in the area. It does not suggest any guidelines regarding labor activities on
the project site. The ERM report referred to an Employment and Workforce Policy
document from an internationally financed project to be used as the guidelines for
addressing labor issues on site, without giving and specific guidelines. During my
fieldwork at the Bui dam project site, I realized there were complains on site by the
Ghanaian semi skilled and unskilled laborers working for Sino Hydro.
The stakeholders involved in the project are the Ghana Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning, Ministry of Energy, the Bui Power Authority (BPA) and Sino
Hydro the Chinese construction firm in charge of building the dam. The Bui Power
Authority is an autonomous agency commissioned by the President of Ghana in
2007 to monitor the overall Bui dam project and also conduct quality control
operations on site. The Chinese company (Sino Hydro) is in charge of recruiting and
managing both unskilled and semi skilled Ghanaian workers for the construction of
the dam and also performed all the technical and professional work on site, which
has resulted a disconnect between BPA officials and Sino Hydro officials regarding
on site labor. As a result, BPA officials on site are out of touch with issues of labor
abuses experienced by the Ghanaians employed by Sino Hydro. The above structure
of management on site between BPA and Sino Hydro has resulted in a lot of unfair
labor practices, which I will discuss below:
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5.5.1 Salaries and Wages Paid to Ghanaian Sino Hydro Workers:
The current minimum wage in Ghana was set at 2.25 Ghana cedis per day by the
Minister of Manpower, Youth and Employment in March 2008 according to the
National Tripartite Committee10 1, which is the equivalent to US $1.59 per day.
Ghanaian employees working for Sino Hydro as semi skilled or unskilled laborers
are paid 3.00 Ghana cedis per day1 02, which is equivalent to US $2.17 per day. In a
month each Sino Hydro worker is paid 90 Ghana cedis or US $63.49. The above
figure shows that Sino Hydro is paying 26% more than the regular minimum wage
earned by other Ghanaian employees. This can be argued as a better wage compared
to the country's minimum wage standard, but the argument should rather focus on a
multinational electricity construction company with a portfolio of $1 billion on the
Bui contract alone paying such meager wages to its Ghanaian workers. Because Sino
Hydro fails to release information about the pay structure of the Chinese unskilled
and semi laborers on site, it is difficult to determine the difference in the pay
structure between these two groups on site. Making it difficult to determine
whether both groups are being treated equally regarding wages.
On the other hand, the Ghanaian engineers or elites employed by the Bui Power
Authority to oversee the dam project and conduct quality control work on site are
being paid lucrative salaries per month by BPA. As result they are far better off than
their unskilled and semi skilled Ghanaian counterparts, which worsens the
101 See The Chronicle, http://allafrica.com/stories/200803101346.html
102 A semi skilled laborer confirmed this figure during an interview while conducting my field
research on site.
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disconnection between the two groups of Ghanaian workers on site. In an interview
with the Chief Environmentalist on site, he told me that they do not get themselves
involved in issues of labor abuse concerning the unskilled workers since the Chinese
are authorized to handle such issues. 103
5.5.2 Working Hours and Conditions:
The established working hours per week in Ghana by law is 45 hours but most
unionized workers used their collective bargaining force to establish 40 hours per
week working period.104 However, the Ghanaian workers under the management of
Sino Hydro are supposed to work a 12-hour shift a day and work 7 days a week,
starting from 7am to 7pm and 7pm to 7am making a total of 84 hours a week per
worker. The extra 39 hours worked as overtime are not calculated and paid as
overtime. Employees are paid their regular 3 Ghana cedis a day on a monthly basis,
which means each worker is paid 90 Ghana cedis for working a minimum of 360
hours total in 30 days.
If an employee misses work for 3 days, he is fired automatically by the Chinese and
replaced by a new recruit. When there is a need for extra workers due to shortage of
labor, the employees are asked to work the extra hours besides their 12-hour shift
as overtime, but the above overtime is not paid by the hour. Rather each employee is
paid and extra 3 Ghana cedis a month for working overtime. On the other hand, the
103 Interview with Mr. Salifu Wumbilla the Environmentalist on the Bui dam site
104 See Ghana Working Conditions, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Ghana-
WORKING-CONDITIONS.html
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Bui Power Authority employees on site work 48 hours or six days a week. The above
is an indicator of how the Sino Hydro employers on the Bui Dam project are abusing
the unskilled and semi Ghanaian workers.
5.5.3 Health and Safety Conditions:
The project site is located in the middle of the forest along the Black Volta and
within the Bui National Park. The entire area is infested with Black flies that cause
onchocerciasis or blindness if they bite you on several occasions and there are
mosquitoes in the area. However Sino Hydro ignored the above threat to the lives of
the workers, by failing to provide them with better housing and working gears that
will minimize the rate of black fly and mosquito bites. Sino Hydro houses the
workers in an abandoned classroom block, where about 18 workers sleep in the
same classroom with no mosquito nets to prevent either the black flies or the
mosquitoes. The workers are provided with construction uniforms, but they are not
given steel toe boots even though they work in a dangerous environment where
construction equipments are in constant motion, meanwhile there are big signs on
site saying steel toe boots and hard hats are required. Some workers complained
that they were not given hard hats either due to shortage in supply and were told to
wait, but have not heard from their supervisors yet about when hard hats will be
provided.
On the other hand, the Chinese and BPA employees sleep in mobile homes on site
provided by Sino Hydro and equipped with air condition units in each room to
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prevent the survival of the mosquitoes and black flies in their rooms. Two people
sleep in one room and the rooms are all hooked up with high-speed Internet. The
Ghanaian Sino Hydro workers are not offered any kind of health insurance to cater
for their health in case they get sick, meanwhile BPA employees are members of the
National Health Insurance Scheme Program in the country. Below is a signpost on
site cautioning people to wear safety helmets and steel toe boots
5.5.4 Chinese Labor Administration and Bui Dam:
As mentioned above, the Bui contract created two different umbrella organizations
on the same project site. They are the Bui Power Authority with its employees on
the payroll of the Government of Ghana through the BPA and there is Sino Hydro,
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which manages all the hiring and administration of both local Ghanaian workers and
Chinese workers undertaking the construction project. Sino Hydro's managing of
the Ghanaian worker is not being monitored directly by any external body either
local or international, which gives them the opportunity to run the site using their
own labor standards as described above. The BPA staff working directly with Sino
Hydro on site are not involved in any form of labor negotiation or activity regarding
the Ghanaian workers employed by Sino Hydro, even though the BPA are the best
agency and in the best position to conduct some form of monitoring of Sino Hydro
labor standards, given that both work and live on the same project site.
A study conducted on the impact of ethnic Chinese network on bilateral trade
established the idea that coethnic networks can promote international trade by
providing community enforcement sanctions that deter violations of contracts in a
weak international environment.10 5 Rauch and Trindade also stated that according
to Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) report "if a business owner violates an
agreement, he is black listed. The above is far worse than being sued, because the
entire Chinese network will refrain from doing business with the guilty party."'1 0 6
However the above strategy is missing in recent Chinese international behavior in
the global labor market, especially within development projects undertaken by the
Chinese in Sub Saharan Africa. China's strategic bilateral relationship on the African
105 See James E. Rauch and Vitor Trindade (February 2002): Ethnic Chinese Networks in
International Trade.
106 See James E. Rauch and Vitor Trindade (February 2002): Ethnic Chinese Networks in
International Trade.
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continent has started attracting a lot of criticism due their style of negotiation and
the labor issues encountered in most African countries where there is Chinese
involvement in a project.
In 2005 the explosion in a Chambishi copper mine, which killed at least 50 workers
was blamed on the Chinese owners for ignoring basic safety regulations leading the
anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia. 10 7 In 2004 there was a massive protest against
Chinese infiltration in Dakar, Senegal with some protesters calling for the president
of the country to kick the Chinese out of the country and both Nigeria and Angola
cancelled contracts worth billions of dollars with China. These were all due lack of
transparency that the Chinese use in handling their negotiations and conducting
business on the African content. A Chinese engineer in charge of building the
Imboulou dam in Congo went to the extent of asking the Congolese government to
make prisoners available to him so he could be sure his workers would not flee,10 8
because regular Congolese workers would not stay longer than a few months
because of the poor working conditions and wages.
In the 19th century, Chinese immigrants working in the United States brought cases
of abuse and unfair treatment against residents of Montana to the courts of Montana
in the 19th century when the Chinese migrated to work in the Montana mines.
According to Wunder, "Their only protection was the law. Believing that an appeal
107 Serge Michel (May 2008): Foreign Policy. www.foreignpolicy.com/chinainafrica
108 See Serge Michel (May 2008): Foreign Policy. www.foreignpolicy.com/chinainafrica
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to reasonable men and heritage of common law might make a difference, Chinese
victims of abuse and discrimination brought their complaints before Montana courts
and hoped for decisions in their favor."10 9 The court, between the late 1860s until
the first passage of a federal statute limiting Chinese immigration in 1882, listened
to Chinese complaints, recognized their seriousness and judged them equitably.110
The Chinese are using their financial capacity to abuse Ghanaians working for them
on the Bui project in Ghana, and no monitoring agency has taken on the task to
regulate their activities including the government of Ghana. Below in figure 5.7 is a
picture that I took of young Ghanaian men lining up to apply for three security
positions that became available during one of my visits to site.
109 See John R. Wunder (Summer 1980): Law and Chinese in Frontier Montana
110 See John R. Wunder (Summer 1980): Law and Chinese in Frontier Montana
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Figure 5.7 Job application center at Bui dam site
5.6 Alternative Sources of Energy
The idea to build a hydroelectric dam at Bui started in the 1920s after Sir Albert
Kitson a geologist discovered the site, since then the government of Ghana has
contracted different energy companies in the world to conduct feasibility about the
possibility of building a hydroelectric dam at Bui. Studies by Sir William Halcrow
and Partners were conducted in 1956, followed by another hydro project study in
1964 by a USSR firm, and in 1976 the government of Ghana contracted Snowy
Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) of Australia to conduct another
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feasibility study of the Bui dam site. In 1985 the Ghana Generation Planning Study
conducted a construction cost estimate study, followed by a feasibility update study
performed by Coyne et Bellier in 1995 and cost estimate study by the same
company in 2006 before the decision to build the dam was made in 2007.
The government of Ghana did not consider other alternative sources of energy such
as thermal, wind or solar because so much had been invested in the Bui site since
1920s. The government's reluctance to conduct further alternative research was
based on the fact that Bui was the best source of power generation to support
Ghana's economic development based on job creation, security of supply and lower
carbon dioxide emissions."1 According to the Energy Commission, no other
alternative locations in Ghana have been identified.
5.7 Impact on Ghana - China Relationship
Ghana is just like any other poor Sub Saharan African country plagued with poverty
and corruption since independence. The government of Ghana is desperate to lift
the country out of the current undesirable economic situation through the
implementation of development projects like dams, roads, stadiums and housing. In
an effort to meet the above challenges the government of Ghana developed a
bilateral or "South-South" relationship with China to undertake big development
project in the country, mainly because of China's financial capability to loan millions
111
111 Ministry of Energy, Ghana
of dollars and invest in development projects in Sub Saharan Africa without the
involvement of other international financial Institutions like the World Bank, IFC
and IMF.112 As of 2008, China's main source of foreign investment funds, known as
the Export-Import Bank of China, planned to spend $20 billion in Africa in the next
three years, which is roughly equal to the amount the entire World Bank group
expects to spend on the continent in the same period.113 The investments by China
in Africa has led to the open door policy by most Sub Saharan African countries with
China, whereby the Chinese are allowed to invest in any sector of the African
economy that is beneficial to the Chinese in exchange for building schools and roads
in Africa.
Most African leaders have concluded that the "South to South" relationship between
their countries and China produces a win-win outcome for both countries. During
the sod cutting ceremony at Bui, the Ghanaian Minister of Energy was quoted saying
"vtr. Chairman, your Excellency, asfor the President andmembers of Sino l-fydro
Corporation team, q would like to say that the negotiations were tough but both sies
workedwith a spirit ofgive andtake to make the Engineering, Procurement and
Construction Contract a win-win contract. T'his spirit has brought us together as one
family andi am very certain that this relation woulcbe maintaineddcuring the
112 International Monetary Fund
113 See Serge Michel (June 2008), When China Met Africa: Foreign Policy.
www.foreignpolicy.com/extras/chinainafrica
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LeveClopmentyhase. Weparticularly thank them for their hospitaity to us in China ''o
allourfriendsfrom China, I say in Chinese, chao (~ello), 9fuan Ying (Welcome) and
Xie Xie (Thank you)." The above quote from the Ghanaian energy minister's speech
clearly suggest that Ghana is willing to engage in any form of development
partnership with China no matter the cost to Ghana. The minister's argument that
the Bui dam contract with China is a win-win contract cannot be proven to the
ordinary citizen, especially if both the Chinese and the Ghanaian officials have
withheld the "EPC Turnkey Contractual Agreement between Ghana and China on the
Bui Dam." The lack access to the Bui agreement by the public makes it impossible for
an independent body to analyze the document and make the facts known to the
public, and until that is achieved it will be premature to claim that the contract was
a win-win, just like the Bujagali Dam in Uganda when the independent studies by
Prayas Energy Group of India revealed that Uganda will be making excessive
payments of $20 million each year if the dam moves under the planned contract
with AES Corporation.
Part of the $1 billion contract signed between Ghana and China will be used to
establish a Chinese language department at the University of Ghana, which is a good
investment given the advantage of being bilingual in the current global world. But in
Brazzaville-Congo elite schools, Chinese has replaced English and French as the
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language to learn.114 Hence, is the investment by the Chinese to open a Chinese
language department in Ghana an effort to put Ghana on the same path as Congo-
Brazzaville? In Congo and Angola, the Chinese are gaining access to oil, copper,
uranium, cobalt and wood that will fuel China's booming industrial revolution while
these African countries get school, roads and other development projects. According
to Huang Zequan, vice president of the Chinese-African People's Friendship
Association, there are now 550,000 Chinese nationals in Africa, compared with
100,000 French citizens and 70,000 Americans. While some Chinese were sent by
Beijing to build dams and railroads, other Chinese simply hope to get rich in some
on the poorest countries in Africa.11s Africa has become the goldmine for China in
the 21st century. As a result, they are motivated to be major players in all the
development projects taking place on the African continent by financing and
engaging in projects like the Bui dam development in Ghana, airport and apartment
buildings in Brazzaville, factories in Lagos, 750 mile highway in Algeria and railways
in Zaire. The African leaders have not hesitated to handover responsibilities of
public office to China, since these leaders turn to China if they want schools or
hospitals which often happens just before elections in order to gain as much profit
as possible from these projects.
114 See Serge Michel (June 2008), When China Met Africa: Foreign Policy.
www.foreignpolicy.com/extras/chinainafrica
115 See Serge Michel (June 2008), When China Met Africa: Foreign Policy.
www.foreignpolicv.com/extras/chinainafrica
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The Congolese (Brazzaville) Minister for Construction and Housing Claude Alphonse
N'Silou was also quoted in an interview with Serge Michel praising the Chinese for
building a dam in Imboulou and the minister's house, a Greco-Roman palace which
the minister claims, makes the US Embassy look like a small bunker. He also said,
"Settled It's win-win! 'too badfor you, in the West, but the Chinese are fantastic." An
advisor to the Algerian Minister of Public Works, Omar Oukil was also quoted
saying, "'The Chinese are incredi6e, they work around the clock, seven days a week. qt
woulcd e goodfor us to if a little bit of their rigorous work culture rubbedoff on us."116
Suggesting a strong "South to South" relationship between Sub Saharan African and
China, but stories coming from the African continent has proven time and again that
the development partnership has always resulted in a win-loss outcome with the
African countries mostly on the losing end.
The above win-loss results has already led to a breakdown in the South-South
relationship between China and some Sub Saharan African countries, as these
countries begin the realize that the Chinese have always been the major
beneficiaries of the relationship as tension continue to mount between the two
partners. For example, Angola a country known as China's spectacular success in
Africa is beginning to question China's commitment to the country, especially when
the Chinese promised in September 2007 to rebuild the railway connecting the
116 See Serge Michel (June 2008), When China Met Africa: Foreign Policy.
www.foreignpolicy.com/extras/chinainafrica
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coastal city of Lobito with Zaire destroyed during the war, but rather ended up
dismantling the railway line and left with everything. The assistant director of
Benguela Railway Company in Lobito confirmed that 16 Chinese camps were
dismantled and a $2 billion contract between the 2 countries was cancelled, but
claimed he knew nothing else since the negotiations took place at a very high
level.117 The Angolans canceled a $3 billion contract for oil refinery in Lobito, and $2
billion allegedly disappeared into Chinese accounts. Meanwhile in April 2006,
Nigeria canceled an agreement in which the Chinese would have paid $2 billion for
first access to four oil blocks, and Guinea called off a billion-dollar financial package
with China, involving a bauxite mine, and aluminum refinery and a hydroelectric
dam.118 Further proving that the partnership between China and its Sub Saharan
African counterparts does not represent the smooth development discourse that
Sub Saharan African leaders actually need to lift their countries out of economic
poverty, but the difficult access to documents on these negotiations has made it
difficult to determine the actual cost - benefit of these "South-South" relationship.
117 See Serge Michel (June 2008), When China Met Africa: Foreign Policy.
www.foreignpolicy.com /extras /chinainafrica
118 See Serge Michel (June 2008), When China Met Africa: Foreign Policy.
www.foreienoolicv.com /extras /chinainafrica
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Chapter Six
Conclusion, Implications and Recommendations
Having analyzed the ongoing Bui dam as a development project that is being
undertaking under the "South to South" relationship between China and Ghana, and
how it plays into the development discourse of Ghana and other Sub Saharan
African countries, this chapter presents the conclusion of the study, implications on
Ghana, specific recommendations and potential areas of further research.
6.1 Conclusion and Implications
The fact that the Bui dam construction that began in 2007 and is an ongoing project
to be completed in 2012 makes it impossible for any research on the dam to draw a
definitive conclusion about the outcome of the project now. However, it creates the
opportunity to study the entire lifecycle of the project, and this can help policy
makers to re-evaluate their decisions about some aspects of the project. The study
showed that the Ghanaian authorities and Sino Hydro are prepared to effectively
address the issue of displacement and resettlement even though their strategy is
very slow. The pragmatic way in which the Bui Power Authority and Sino Hydro
quickly resettled the immediate villages that will be affected as a result of the
construction, and the provision of concrete houses as compared to the mud houses
that the displaced residents were living in, is an example of a how the government of
Ghana is serious about not repeating the mistakes of the Akosombo dam. The
resettled villagers were also provided with infrastructure like borehole to provide
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good drinking water, toilets, schools and high nutrient land for farming, most
residents interviewed mutually approved of the new farmland.
The government of Ghana also addressed the issue of migrants in the Bui dam area
effectively by acquiring land from the Gyama traditional council to resettle the
affected migrants; the land used for the resettlement site now belongs to the
government of Ghana. Meaning the migrants are better secured on the resettlement
site since they do not have to worry about the Gyama traditional council claiming
the land in the future, which used to be the situation that the migrants were
experiencing prior to the construction of the dam. There are more resettlements to
be conducted in the future especially in the outer years of the project, which makes
it premature to state that the overall resettlement exercise was successful. But given
the initial approach adopted, it can be concluded that if the Bui Power Authority
continues with the same methodology the overall resettlement exercise will be
successful.
Ineffective planning processes in big development projects have always led to either
failure of project or "nimbyism" from the public, pressure groups, advocacy groups
and Non Governmental Organizations. An example is how the Internationals Rivers
Network with the help of other advocacy groups pressured the World Bank to pull
out of its $215 million political risk guarantee for the Bujagali dam in Uganda, 19 due
119 See Harvard Business School Case No 204 - 083: International Rivers Network and the Bujagali
Dam Project
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to the ineffective planning adopted by Museveni's government. The Ghanaian
government, after learning from other controversial dam projects and the
Akosombo dam, decided to undertake a participatory planning approach during the
design stages of the project by hiring Environmental Resources Management an
independent agency to conduct the Environment and Social Impact Assessment
study. Student experts were also hired to conduct social surveys in the Bui dam area
on the residents to be impacted by the dam and the survey results were used to
guide the recommendation made by the ESIA report on the project. The public
hearings held in Accra and the local communities of Bui to inform the public about
the project and also listen to their opinion and integrate them into the project was
also a very effective approach by the government to address the dam related
problems. It should be noted that the Bui project was being financed by the Export
Import Bank of China and constructed by Sino Hydro a Chinese company; hence
none of the countries involved had the obligation to use IFC and World Bank
standards to guide the planning of the Bui dam project since these institutions were
not financing the project. But the Ghana government actually used the guidelines
and policies of the World Bank and IFC during the planning process to guide the
project.
Though the Bui Power Authority and the Sino Hydro took a pragmatic approach to
address issues of resettlement, displacement and the planning process, the study
has shown that they failed to exhibit the same level of capacity in other important
areas of the project. It can be concluded that the Ghanaian government failed to
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regulate and monitor labor issues on site by leaving it to the Chinese to handle,
which suggests how the Ghana government and leaders in other African countries
are willing to leave their offices for the Chinese to control in exchange for a
development project. The Chinese are known to abuse labor standards in their own
country, hence it was a miscalculated move to allow them to manage labor issues in
Ghana where Ghanaians are the employees, without any form local monitoring
agency to oversee or inspect working conditions on the dam site. The classified
nature of the Bui dam agreement has also compounded the labor problem since
nobody knows whether the contract deliberately allowed the Chinese to manage
labor issues, which is why the Ghanaian government is being silent on the topic or it
is the lack of technical and financial capacity that is preventing the Ghanaian Labor
Agency to intervene on the matter.
It can also be concluded that the environmental problems to be caused by the
construction of the dam are not being acted upon in an adequate manner, especially
the Bui National Park and the hippo pools that will be inundated by the reservoir. It
is arguable that the project is in its second year. The authorities in charge should be
given time to act at their own pace but I believe wasting time to act on the
environment is a bad idea, especially given the impact that the dam is going to have
on the Bui National Park by inundating 21% of the park and flooding all the 13
hippo pools. The best time to save these endangered species reported in the ESIA
report is now, while the dam construction is ongoing rather than wait until the
reservoir is being flooded before acting. Secondly both the Ghana Wildlife Division
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and the Environmental Protection Agency of Ghana does not have the technical,
human and financial capacity to effectively address the problems of the park alone.
The Wildlife Division prior to the Bui dam construction could not even keep up with
the illegal hunting and tree cutting that was going on in the park by residents of the
Bui area, which makes me wonder how they will be able to address these big
flooding issues without help from an external body or agency.
The financial section of the study also concludes that the Electricity Company of
Ghana (ECG) will be locked into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), which might
not be profitable to the company. The ECG is the distribution company in charge of
selling electricity to customers in the country, hence the mandatory nature of the
Bui contract that requires ECG to exclusively purchase power generated from the
Bui dam does not give ECG the ability to shop for other cheaper alternative energy
supply from Cote d'Ivoire. The above implies that if cost of electricity generation
goes up at Bui dam the authorities or the Chinese will sell energy to ECG at a higher
price, since the current PPA agreement in the contract is not fixed and can be
adjusted up at anytime by Bui. A higher power purchase price will result in ECG
passing the higher price unto the consumer if they are operating on a full cost
recovery basis because they have monopoly power in the electricity supply sector in
the country. However if the government is subsidizing the ECG, then an increase in
power purchase means the government will have to divert resources meant to
develop other sectors of the economy to subsidize electricity distribution to
customers, ignoring other sectors of the economy that need adequate investment. In
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the long run it is the customers or the citizens of Ghana that will be victims of the
Bui contractual agreement that has mandated ECG to buy all the energy produced by
the Bui dam and the Chinese will continue to enjoy their high cash flow stream,
since any attempt by the ECG not to purchase energy from Bui due to low purchase
rates elsewhere will lead to a breach in contract which can negatively impact the
relationship if the two countries.
The Cocoa Sales Agreement (CSA) mandates the Ghana Cocoa Board to allocate
30,000 tons of cocoa beans to Genertec International Corporation of Beijing per
every crop year for 20 years to service part of the debt owed to China, this will have
serious implications on Ghana's foreign currency reserve. Ghana relies on cocoa
export as one of its main sources of national income hence allocating the above
quantity of cocoa to the Chinese for 20 years will cut deep into Ghana's source of
revenue. Also if the price of cocoa on the world market is above the price that China
is paying for each ton of cocoa allocated to Genertec (China) each year then Ghana
will be economically better off selling its cocoa beans on the world market and use
the cash obtained to service the debt from the Bui loan. However the contract has
already been signed and information regarding the price that China will be paying
for each ton of cocoa has been classified, leaving the Ghanaian public to be victims of
the negotiations especially if the deal actual benefits the Chinese and not the
Ghanaians.
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6.2 Specific Recommendations
The government of Ghana and Sino Hydro made a good effort in addressing the
displacement and resettlement problems that will be posed by the dam; however
settling human beings alone does not solve the threat of the Bui dam project. Since
the government of Ghana applied the World Bank and International Finance
Corporation's rules and policies to the planning process, it is necessary that the
government also applies the International Labor Organization's (ILO) rules,
Ghanaian Labor rules and World Trade Organization laws to the workers on the Bui
dam project to help prevent the harsh labor conditions being enforced by the
Chinese to the Ghanaian workers on site.
The Ghanaian government should also set up a separate comprehensive
hippopotamus action plan committee, to create an effective strategy to help the
Ghana Wildlife Division to relocate all the hippos and other endangered species a
before the dam is completed. The above committee should be an independent body
made up of NGOs, people from academia, planners and international organizations
with financial support from the government for relocation of the animals.
Government of Ghana should also allocate more money towards the effort to save
the endangered species by making the issue a matter of national security, instead
concentrating its entire effort of getting the dam built to generate electricity.
The diversion of the youth from agriculture to working on the Bui dam project is a
national food security issue given the long-term effect on food production in the
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country. The government needs to take steps to address the above issue, by
investing more of the country's budget into the agriculture sector and providing
farmers with modern agricultural tools and training, providing farmers with high
yielding seeds, fertilizers at affordable prices, building storage facilities to store
excess farm products in order to save the agricultural sector. Building access roads
to rural communities that supply the country's food will enable market women to go
to these areas to buy the farm products and transport them to the cities, which will
put money into the pockets of these farmers to enable the stay in the farming sector.
If the problems of farming are not addressed now, more of the youth will leave the
farm to work on the dam and other sectors of the economy and food prices will
skyrocket as a result of the shortage.
The government of Ghana should be transparent with big development contracts in
the future by opening up the bidding process, since this will help create a healthy
competition and also result in careful negotiation of projects that will actually result
in a win-win situation and desist from the idea of close door negotiation. It will also
be helpful if the government of Ghana can make the Bui dam turnkey and
contractual agreement accessible to public so the independent agencies and people
in academia can conduct their own evaluation and make non binding
recommendations, since these independent evaluations are capable of capturing
certain relevant information that will help future negotiations.
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The lack of willingness by the two countries to share information such as the
Turnkey Contractual Agreement between Ghana and China on the Bui Dam Project,
has made it difficult for independent organizations like NGOs, Local Community
Groups, Pressure Groups, International Labor Organizations and other Foreign
countries to know the details of the Bui contract and other contract projects in the
country. Which makes it difficult to determine whether the Chinese are violating
contract details or the actual contract signed gave them the mandate to violate
workers rights. It thus necessary for transnational advocacy groups, NGOs and local
pressure groups to put pressure on the Ghanaian government and parliament to
make these documents public, in order to enable independent organizations to
evaluate the documents and make recommendations where it is determined that the
contract does not favor the Ghanaian worker. Just like how the release of the
Bujagali dam contract details by the Ugandan government, enabled Prayas Energy
Group of India an independent company to analyze the Power Purchase Agreement
(PPA) of the project and demonstrated that Uganda will be faced with an average of
$20 million in excessive payments each year if the dam moves forward under the
current contract.120 The above approach will promote transparency in all
negotiations that the government of Ghana undertakes with foreign counterparts
and also lead to effective results of project, given the fact that independent agencies
will be allowed to voice their opinion on projects or government contracts based on
actual statistical analysis instead of assumptions.
120 See ECA Watch (September 2003): Race to the Bottom, Take II
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The absence of financing from other international financial organizations such as
the World Bank and the International Financial Corporation also makes it difficult
for the Sino Hydro (Chinese) to be held by the accountable to international labor
standards by these internationals organizations. Further compounding the problem
is the fact that the Ghanaian government's ambition to see the dam built has
resulted in the government's lack of interest to address unfair labor conditions on
site. China's history of labor abuse makes the situation problematic, which might
make if difficult for Chinese courts to hear the case of Ghanaian workers being
treated unfairly by a Chinese company in Ghana and rule in favor of the Ghanaian
workers. Non Governmental Organizations and local pressure groups need to
document stories about the treatment of Ghana workers on site by the Chinese, and
make short documentaries that can be published in the media and shown on
television networks in Ghana and the rest of the world to bring the situation to light.
The exposure of the working conditions at the Bui dam site will force the Ghanaian
government to take pragmatic steps to resolve the situation, given that politicians
willing to retain power in election will see the risk of losing their seats. The effective
international campaign against the Narmada dam in India and the exposure of the
damages that it will cause and has already caused influenced the World Bank to
withdraw from the project.
The Bui dam contract must be revised to enable the Bui Power Authority to be in
charge of recruiting and managing the activities of semi skilled and unskilled
Ghanaians employed to work on the project. Giving authority to BPA to organize the
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workers means they will be in charge of wages, accommodation, health and safety
and working conditions of the workers, while the Chinese will only play supervisory
role of the Ghanaian workers. The above will require overhead cost projections to
be made within the loan agreement to cater for the upkeep of the workers. Also,
because the BPA employees are already living on the same site with the unskilled
workers, it will be easy to implement the above strategy without increasing
overhead cost, since there will be no need to build and staff a new office on site.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regulates minimum wages, maximum hours
and child labor, making employers liable to their employees for violations of the Act.
A substantial number of employers, however, particularly in labor - intensive
industries, persistently violate these regulations or standards. 121 But how will these
labor standards be ensured in the Bui dam context, given that it is the Chinese that
are in charge of constructing the dam? Ghana's labor office can be used to ensure
that the above standards are enforced on site, but the office lacks the technical and
human capacity needed to undertake effective monitoring of work places in the
country, which has left the Chinese to unfairly treat the Ghanaian workers. The
presence of BPA employees on site, conducting quality control and overall technical
monitoring of the project can be used as a leverage by the Ghanaian government to
recruit labor monitoring officers as affiliates of BPA to inspect and monitor how the
Chinese manage labor activities on site. But this can be achieved only if there is the
121 Leo L. Lam (December 1992), Designer Duty: Extending Liability to Manufacturers for Violations
of Labor Standards in Garment Industry Sweatshops.
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political willingness by the government to ensure fair labor treatment on site, which
is currently lacking.
Local pressure groups and NGOs can assist the abused workers collect data and
evidence about the labor issues on site and take Sino Hydro (Chinese) to Ghanaian
courts to appeal their cases. Although there is evidence that the government has
compromised courts in Ghana and hence the courts tend to rule in favor of the
Ghanaian government, there is also evidence of individuals winning some lawsuits
brought against the government in the country. The Bui workers with the help of
independent organizations can bring lawsuits against Sino Hydro and fight for good
working conditions.
6.2.1 Monitoring Approach
In order to ensure that the above approach to labor works effectively, the
government of Ghana must show its willingness to make information available
through the freedom of information act. This bill was introduced to the Ghanaian
parliament several times but it gets nowhere on the floor during debates, simply
because of the government's unwillingness to make access to information in the
country public. If the above bill is introduced and passes, it will enable all
individuals to seek any information that they want from the government such as
turnkey contracts, concession contracts and employment contracts without any red
tape and bureaucracy blocking their access. The freedom of information act bill, if
passed will ensure government officials negotiating contracts on behalf the country
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recruit qualified people with adequate technical capacity and understanding needed
to close deals on contracts, which will lead to positive and profitable outcomes on
the country's economy.
The road to the Bui dam site is very rough and dangerous to navigate making it
difficult for radio stations, NGOs, pressure groups and the Media houses based in the
Capital city of Accra to monitor and update the general public about the conditions
on the dam site through their network channels. To make the above
recommendations effective, there is the need for the organizations mentioned above
to recruit local residents in the Bui area and make them their point of contact with
the rest of the world, by giving them the task to investigate and pass on information
to the Accra based organizations to publish and broadcast. The above monitoring
strategy will have a big impact on the way the Chinese handle labor situation on site,
because they are aware of the resentment by some part of the population in Ghana
and other countries in Sub Saharan Africa countries and do not want to worsen the
situation. The Chief engineer of Sino Hydro, Mr. Lu specifically told me at their head
office in Accra that I should write something good about the project when he
realized that it was the research was for my thesis. He asked me to that because he
had started feeling the resentment being shown by Ghanaians in the country about
the project. Hence, a weekly update about working conditions on television and
radio will force Sino Hydro change its course.
129
Last but not the least, hydroelectric dams are not sustainable in energy generation
over the long-term due to their vulnerability to siltation and changes in rainfall
pattern that affects the level of water in the reservoir needed for electricity
generation. I will thus ask the government of Ghana to start researching into the
possibility of other sources of energy, so that the country does not find itself relying
entirely on hydroelectric power in the future because doing so will force the country
to build another dam if the Bui dam fail to sustain the demand capacity in the future.
6.3 Areas of Further Research
There are a lot of areas to be studied about the Bui dam and the entire China-Africa
relationship and the impact that it has on both parties. An area that needs attention
on the Bui dam project is the labor issues on the site, a lot of labor related issues
have been studied regarding global supply chain companies and how they operate
in host nations, but the Bui dam labor problems can be studied by trying to
understand why two different agencies the BPA and Sino Hydro are operating on the
same project, meanwhile the elite Ghanaian are being managed by the government
and the non elite or unskilled Ghanaian are being managed Sino hydro (the
Chinese), and what is the motivation behind that sort of separation. It has also been
repeated in recent literature that the Chinese are using prisoners from China to do
the construction works in Sub Saharan Africa, hence it is necessary to study the
reasons behind their strategy and the impact that it will have on local people. The
Bui dam itself is an ongoing project, so follow up research about how the Bui
National Park was finally handled and which stakeholders played major roles in the
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process is needed to draw an overall conclusion about the dam project. Follow up
research can also be conducted about how the rest of the resettlement exercise took
place and how the displaced residents define their current conditions, living in the
shadows of the new dam after the floods compared to their conditions prior to the
dam construction. The influx of the Chinese into the Sub Saharan African continent
to engage in aggressive development projects, is an emerging topic that needs to be
researched to properly understand the motive behind this "South to South"
relationship and also help make recommendation on the way forward about the
above relationship to the African countries. Since the only way to ensure a better
outcome from the African development relationship with China is by having the
capacity to negotiate win-win contracts and not just contracts to build some roads
and schools, while trading off valuable resources to the Chinese.
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Appendix 1
An exempt species may only be hunted, captured or destroyed by a
Ghanaian citizen for use by himself or his dependents, and may not be
traded except with a wildlife trade permit.
The draft Wildlife Act (2005) also states that animals not listed in Schedules I
and II are categorised as "partially protected" animals throughout Ghana.
Table H1.5 Species of Conservation Concern Recorded Within the Study Area
Scientific Name Common Name Ghana IUCN CITES
Varanus nilotocus Nile Monitor Schedule I Appendix II
Varanus exanthematicus Savanna Monitor Appendix II
Python regius Royal Python Appendix II
Python sebae African Python Appendix II
Crocodylus niloticus Nile Crocodile Schedule I VU
Crocodylus cataphractus Slender-snouted Crocodile Schedule I DD
Osteolaemus tetraspis Dwarf Crocodile Schedule I VU
Thrynonomys Grasscutter Schedule II
swinderianus
Cricetomys gambianus Gambian Giant Rat Schedule II
Falco naumanni Lesser Kestrel Schedule I VU
Cisticola guinea Dorst's Cisticola DD
Aviceda uculoides African Cuckoo Hawk Schedule I
Macheiramphus alcinus Bat Hawk Schedule I
Polyboroides typus African Harrier Hawk Schedule I
Gypohierax angolensis Palm-nut Vulture Schedule I
Gyps africanus White-backed Vulture Schedule I
Trigonoceps occipitalis White-headed Vulture Schedule I
Circaetus cinereus Brown Snake Eagle Schedule I
Aquila wahlbergi Wahlberg's Eagle Schedule I
Hieraaetus spilogaster African Hawk Eagle Schedule I
Polemaetus bellicosus Martial Eagle Schedule I
Butastur rufipennis Grasshopper Buzzard Schedule I
Kaupifalco Lizard Buzzard Schedule I
monogrammnicus
Bu teo auguralis Red-necked Buzzard Schedule I
Falco alopex Fox Kestrel Schedule I
Falco ardosiaceus Grey Kestrel Schedule I
Tyto alba Barn Owl Schedule I
Otus senegalensis African Scops Owl Schedule I
Otus (Ptilopsis) leucotis N. White-faced Owl Schedule I
Bubo africanus Spotted Eagle Owl Schedule I
cinerascens
Bubo lacteus Verreaux's Eagle Owl Schedule I
Scotopelia peli Pel's Fishing Owl Schedule I
Glaucidium perlatum Pearl-spotted Owlet Schedule I
Glaucidiumn capense. Barred Owlet Schedule I
Strix woodfordii Wood Owl Schedule 1
Bubulcus ibis. Cattle Egret Schedule I
Egretta garzetta Little Egret Schedule I
Nycticorax nycticorax Black-crowned Night Heron Schedule I
Gorsachius leuconotus White-backed Night Heron Schedule I
Ardeola ralloides Squacco Heron Schedule I
Butorides striata Green-backed Heron Schedule I
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Scientific Name Common Name Ghana IUCN CITES
Ardea cinerea Grey Heron Schedule I
Scopus urnbretta Hamerkop Schedule I
Eupodotis melanogaster Black-bellied Bustard Schedule I
Poicephalus robustus Brown-necked Parrot Schedule 1
Poicephalus senegalus Senegal Parrot Schedule I
Colobus polykomnos Black-white Colubus Schedule I LR/nt Appendix II
Cercopithecus mona Mona Monkey Schedule I Appendix II
Cercopithecus petaurista Spot-nosed Monkey Schedule I Appendix 11
Crcopithecuss aethiops Green Monkey Appendix II
Erythrocebus patas Patas (Red) Monkey Appendix II
Cercocebus torquatos White-crown Mangabey LR/nt Appendix I[
Papio cynocephalus Baboon Appendix II
Galago senegalensis Senegal Galago/Bushbaby Schedule I Appendix It
Galagoides deinidoff Demidoff's Galago Schedule I Appendix II
Mellivora capensis Honey badger/ ratel Schedule I Appendix III
Galerella Slender Mongoose Appendix III
Crossarchus obscurus Cusimanse Appendix III
Mungos gainbianius Gambian Mongoose Appendix III
Atilax paludinosus Marsh Mongoose Appendix III
Civettictis civetta African Civet Appendix Ill
Profelis aurata Golden Cat Schedule I VU Appendix II
Panthera pardus Leopard Schedule I Appendix I
Phataginus tricuspis Tree Pangolin Schedule I Appendix II
Uromanis tetradactyla Long-tailed Pangolin Schedule I Appendix II
Smutsia gigantean Giant Pangolin Schedule I Appendix II
Orycteropus afer Aardvark Schedule I
Hippopotamus amphibus Hippopotamus Schedule I Appendix II
Syncercus caffer nanus African Buffulo Schedule I LR/cd
Cephalophus dorsalis Bay Duiker Schedule I LR/nt Appendix II
Cephalophus niger Black Duiker Schedule I LR/nt
Cephalophus rufilatuis Red-flanked Duiker LR/cd
Cephalophus silvicultor Yellow-backed Duiker Schedule I LR/nt
Alcelaphlus buselaphus Hartebeest LR/cd
Koblus kob Kob LR/cd
Kobus ellipsiprymnus Waterbuck Schedule I LR/cd
Redunca redunca Bohor Reedbuck Schedule I LR/cd
Hippotragus equinls Roan Antelope Schedule I LR/cd
Neotragus pygymaeus Royal Antelope LR/nt
Ourebia ourebi Oribi Schedule I
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